๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ CVE-2026-45866
โšช Unknown โœ… No Known Exploit NVD
N/A
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: caif: fix use-after-free in caif_serial ldisc_close() There is a use-after-free bug in caif_serial where handle_tx() may access ser->tty after the tty has been freed. The race condition occurs between ldisc_close() and packet transmission: CPU 0 (close) CPU 1 (xmit) ------------- ------------ ldisc_close() tty_kref_put(ser->tty) [tty may be freed here] caif_xmit() handle_tx() tty = ser->tty // dangling ptr tty->ops->write() // UAF! schedule_work() ser_release() unregister_netdevice() The root cause is that tty_kref_put() is called in ldisc_close() while the network device is still active and can receive packets. Since ser and tty have a 1:1 binding relationship with consistent lifecycles (ser is allocated in ldisc_open and freed in ser_release via unregister_netdevice, and each ser binds exactly one tty), we can safely defer the tty reference release to ser_release() where the network device is unregistered. Fix this by moving tty_kref_put() from ldisc_close() to ser_release(), after unregister_netdevice(). This ensures the tty reference is held as long as the network device exists, preventing the UAF. Note: We save ser->tty before unregister_netdevice() because ser is embedded in netdev's private data and will be freed along with netdev (needs_free_netdev = true). How to reproduce: Add mdelay(500) at the beginning of ldisc_close() to widen the race window, then run the reproducer program [1]. Note: There is a separate deadloop issue in handle_tx() when using PORT_UNKNOWN serial ports (e.g., /dev/ttyS3 in QEMU without proper serial backend). This deadloop exists even without this patch, and is likely caused by inconsistency between uart_write_room() and uart_write() in serial core. It has been addressed in a separate patch [2]. KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_tx+0x5d1/0x620 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881131e1490 by task caif_uaf_trigge/9929 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 handle_tx+0x5d1/0x620 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9d/0x6c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6e2/0x4410 packet_xmit+0x243/0x360 packet_sendmsg+0x26cf/0x5500 __sys_sendto+0x4a3/0x520 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f615df2c0d7 Allocated by task 9930: Freed by task 64: Last potentially related work creation: The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881131e1000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1168 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff8881131e1000, ffff8881131e1800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last free pid 9778 tgid 9778 stack trace: Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881131e1380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881131e1400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8881131e1480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881131e1500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881131e1580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/f683f244544f7b11e7fa87df9e6c2eeb [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-serial/[email protected]/T/#u

Details

Severity Unknown
CVSS Score N/A
CVSS Vector N/A
CWE N/A
Public Exploit โœ… No
Source NVD
Published 2026-05-27
Updated 2026-06-02
Modified 2026-05-27
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
unknown โ€” โ€”

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