Description
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| quinn | 0.11.0 | 0.11.4 |
| quinn-proto | — | — |
Similar Threats
- High CVE-2026-31812
- Unknown MAL-2025-107666
- High CVE-2024-45311
- High CVE-2023-42805
Exploit Protection
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