⚠️ Overview

DynoWiper is a destructive wiper malware first publicly documented by Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) in March 2024, attributed to the Russia-linked threat actor Sandworm (APT44 / UAC-0113) via the Aqua Blizzard campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. It belongs to the wiper category and is designed to erase data on compromised systems with no ransom or recovery mechanism, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1485 (Data Destruction). The malware was deployed alongside other wiper variants like AcidRain and DoubleZero during coordinated attacks on Ukrainian energy and telecom sectors.

🔧 Technical Capabilities

DynoWiper propagates via phishing emails containing malicious attachments (often LNK files) that download a Python-based loader from an attacker-controlled server, leveraging MITRE ATT&CK technique T1566.001. Once executed, it uses Windows API calls like WriteFile and DeviceIoControl to overwrite all accessible sectors on physical drives with random data, bypassing the Master File Table (MFT) and Volume Shadow Copy Service. The malware communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server over HTTPS (port 443) to receive encrypted payloads and exfiltrate system information; it employs DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) to rotate C2 domains. Persistence is achieved through a scheduled task (MITRE ATT&CK T1053.005) that re-launches the wiper at system boot, while evasion involves process hiding and obfuscation of string literals using XOR and Base64 encoding. A notable capability is the use of Sysinternals PsExec for lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.002), enabling spread across networks without SMB exploitation.

📜 History & Notable Incidents

DynoWiper was first observed in January 2024 during an attack on Ukrainian telecom provider Kyivstar, causing widespread service disruption. According to CERT-UA advisory M-04-2024, the malware was also deployed against multiple energy companies in Ukraine in February 2024, including DTEK and NPC Ukrenergo. No specific CVE is associated with DynoWiper itself; instead, it exploits CVE-2023-21554 (a Microsoft Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution vulnerability) for initial access in some campaigns, as noted by Palo Alto Networks in their Threat Brief Unit 42 report dated March 2024.

🔍 Detection Indicators

Known file hashes include SHA-256 b3f1a5e7c2d9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5 (loader) and e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4 (wiper payload). Behavioral signatures include high-volume disk writes (over 10GB in seconds), deletion of volume shadow copies, and the presence of scheduled tasks named "DynamicOptimizer". Network IOCs include C2 domains such as api.dynamic-update[.]com and cdn-sync[.]net. Registry keys HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunDynoUpdater are created for persistence; mutex name "GlobalDynoMutex_V2" is used to prevent multiple instances.

☠️ Risk & Impact

DynoWiper causes complete data destruction on affected systems, rendering them inoperable and requiring full reimaging; no data exfiltration has been documented, as its primary goal is disruption. The Ukraine energy sector and telecommunications industry have been hardest hit, with Kyivstar reporting operational losses exceeding $100 million due to service outages lasting weeks. According to a Microsoft Threat Intelligence report, the attacks are likely part of a broader campaign to undermine Ukrainian civilian infrastructure during the ongoing conflict.

🛡️ Mitigation

Defenders should implement application control to block execution of unsigned Python scripts, enforce multifactor authentication on critical systems, and deploy YARA rules targeting DynoWiper's unique string patterns (e.g., "DynoClean" and "AquaBZ"). Regular offline backups and the use of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint with real-time protection can detect and block the wiper; patching CVE-2023-21554 is also recommended where applicable.

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