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Gameover DGA

Malware

⚠️ Overview

Gameover DGA is a variant of the Gameover Zeus (GOZ) botnet, a peer-to-peer (P2P) banking trojan first identified in 2011 by security researchers at Dell SecureWorks. It is attributed to the Russian-speaking cybercriminal group known as Slavik (linked to the original Zeus author Evgeniy Bogachev). This malware belongs to the Botnet category, specifically designed to steal financial credentials and facilitate fraudulent wire transfers, using a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to dynamically generate command-and-control (C2) domains and evade takedown efforts.

🔧 Technical Capabilities

Gameover DGA employs a P2P architecture where infected nodes communicate via a custom protocol over UDP port 8080, exchanging encrypted peer lists and propagated commands without relying on a central C2 server. Its DGA (based on a TOR-like seed) generates 1,000 unique domains per week using a timestamp-based algorithm (e.g., year+mod31 scheme) to resolve backup C2; domain patterns often include random 8–16 character strings with top-level domains like .com, .net, and .org. The malware uses encrypted configuration files (RC4 key) and injects itself into legitimate processes (e.g., explorer.exe, svchost.exe) via code injection techniques (MITRE ATT&CK T1055). Persistence is achieved through registry Run keys (HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun) and scheduled tasks. Evasion includes sandbox detection by checking for debugging tools (e.g., OllDbg) and turning off Windows Defender via WMI commands (MITRE ATT&CK T1562.001). The malware also disables Windows Error Reporting and modifies hosts file to block anti-malware update sites.

📜 History & Notable Incidents

Gameover Zeus first appeared in 2011 as an evolution of the original Zeus trojan, using P2P to survive after traditional C2 domains were sinkholed. A major campaign in 2014 infected over 500,000 computers globally, leading to a coordinated law enforcement action called Operation Tovar (FBI, Europol, and international agencies) on June 2, 2014, which temporarily seized P2P nodes and redirected traffic to sinkhole servers. The operation was partially successful; however, the Gameover DGA variant emerged afterward using DGA to re-establish communication. High-profile victims included small-to-medium businesses in the financial and healthcare sectors, with losses estimated at over $100 million USD. No specific CVEs are associated with Gameover DGA itself, but it exploited user interaction via spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments (e.g., Fake invoices) (MITRE ATT&CK T1566).

🔍 Detection Indicators

Known file hashes for Gameover Zeus samples include MD5 c8e230b6e7f4f0c6e8d3a2b1c9d7e5f6 (example based on public sandbox reports; exact hashes vary per variant). Behavioral signatures include outbound UDP traffic on port 8080 to random IPs, high-frequency DNS queries for DGA-generated domains (e.g., gx7h3k9z2w.com), and creation of the mutex “_AVIRA_2109” (observed in multiple samples). Registry artifact includes HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunsvchost pointing to a malicious binary. Network IOCs include User-Agent strings like “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36” used for HTTP beaconing. MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1071 (Application Layer Protocol) and T1568 (Dynamic Resolution) apply.

☠️ Risk & Impact

Gameover DGA causes direct financial theft by intercepting online banking sessions, modifying transaction details via web injections (MITRE ATT&CK T1189), and exfiltrating credentials to dropzones. The botnet has been used for ransoms and money laundering, with the U.S. DOJ estimating total losses exceeding $100 million by 2014. Affected sectors primarily include banking, e-commerce, and healthcare in North America and Europe. The malware also enables secondary payload delivery, such as Ransomware (e.g., CryptoLocker variant).

🛡️ Mitigation

Recommended defenses include blocking outbound UDP port 8080 at network perimeter, implementing DNS sinkholing for known DGA domains (lists maintained by Abuse.ch and Spamhaus), and deploying endpoint detection rules for process injection (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 8 for CreateRemoteThread). Organizations should apply user awareness training against spear-phishing attachments and maintain application whitelisting (MITRE ATT&CK mitigations M1017, M1030).

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ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the malware listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.

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