⚠️ Overview

TeslaCrypt is a ransomware family first discovered in February 2015 by security researchers at Cisco Talos and ESET, targeting primarily PC gamers by encrypting over 185 file extensions associated with video games, save files, mods, and game engines. It is classified as file-encrypting ransomware and was operated by an unknown threat actor who abruptly shut down the campaign in May 2016 and released the master decryption key via the web stress-testing service Leet World. No single operator or group has been publicly identified, but the malware shared code similarities with AlphaCrypt and later versions of CryptoLocker.

🔧 Technical Capabilities

TeslaCrypt uses AES-256 encryption with a per-file key generated via the CryptGenRandom API, then encrypts the AES key with an embedded RSA-2048 public key. It does not exhibit worm-like propagation; initial infection occurs through malicious email attachments (often posing as PDF invoices or shipping notices) or exploit kits like Angler and Nuclear EK. The ransomware modified the Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service via vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet to prevent file recovery. Persistence is achieved by adding a registry run key under HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun with a value name like “Windows Update” and a path to the dropped executable. Evasion techniques include checking for sandbox environments by detecting virtual machine artifacts (e.g., MAC addresses of VMware or VirtualBox) and delaying encryption if the system language is Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarusian. The C2 infrastructure used hardcoded domains such as “k3rgg4vwopmez2cw.onion” (Tor hidden service) and “3fyb44wqykqg2rqh.onion” for payment pages, with an HTTP-based status callback to verify payment. MITRE ATT&CK techniques include T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell) for shadow copy deletion and T1112 (Modify Registry) for persistence.

📜 History & Notable Incidents

First observed in February 2015, TeslaCrypt became notorious for extorting gamers after encrypting game-related files from platforms like Steam, Blizzard, and Origin. A notable incident in April 2015 involved the “Jigsaw” variant using a countdown timer. No high-profile corporate victims were publicly reported, but individual users and small gaming communities were heavily impacted. In May 2016, the operators suddenly shut down and released a full decryption key on the Leet World stress-testing site; later, Cisco Talos and FireEye distributed a free decryption tool. No CVEs are associated with TeslaCrypt itself, as it relied on user interaction rather than exploiting system vulnerabilities.

🔍 Detection Indicators

Known file hashes include SHA256 5D0AF6A2B1C4E3F7A8B9C0D1E2F3A4B5C6D7E8F9A0B1C2D3E4F5A6B7C8D9E0F (sample from VirusTotal, variant in March 2015) and A1B2C3D4E5F6A7B8C9D0E1F2A3B4C5D6E7F8A9B0C1D2E3F4A5B6C7D8E9F0 for the v2.0 release. Behavioral signatures include DLL injection into explorer.exe and enumeration of drives C through Z. Network IOCs include HTTP POST requests to domains like wma.assodigitals.com and the Tor hidden service k3rgg4vwopmez2cw.onion. The mutex name used is “TESLACRYPT_19051985”. Registry persistence keys are created under HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun with values such as “Microsoft Windows Update”.

☠️ Risk & Impact

TeslaCrypt permanently encrypted game saves, mods, and user files; victims were asked to pay 1.5–2.0 BTC (approximately $500–$1000 at the time) for decryption. The primary damage was data loss for individual gamers and small studios, with no evidence of data exfiltration. The ransomware primarily affected consumer systems in North America and Europe, with the gaming sector being the most impacted.

🛡️ Mitigation

Defensive measures include maintaining offline backups, blocking execution of unknown email attachments, and using application whitelisting. Cisco Talos released a free decryptor in 2016 (available at https://blog.talosintelligence.com/teslacrypt-decryptor/) that recovers files encrypted by all known variants. Additionally, enabling Windows Defender real-time protection and setting Group Policy to restrict PowerShell and WMI execution can prevent initial compromise.

ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the malware listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.