WINELOADER

Loader

⚠️ Overview

Wineloader is a loader malware first documented publicly by CrowdStrike in early 2020 as a component of the ransomware ecosystem operated by the financially motivated threat group WIZARD SPIDER (UNC1878). It belongs to the category of droppers and loaders, designed exclusively to deliver secondary payloads—most notably the Ryuk ransomware—by executing shellcode or Portable Executable (PE) files in memory.

🔧 Technical Capabilities

Wineloader propagates as a DLL side-loading payload, exploiting legitimate Windows binaries (e.g., mavinject.exe) via the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1574.002. Its primary attack vector is spam‑distributed macros that download a first‑stage file, often a JavaScript or VBS script, which then retrieves and executes Wineloader from a remote C2 server. Persistence is achieved through registry Run keys or scheduled tasks, and evasion relies on API unhooking via direct syscalls (T1562.001) and packing with UPX or custom obfuscators. The loader uses process injection (T1055.012) to hollow a trusted process (e.g., svchost.exe) and execute the ransomware payload without touching disk.

📜 History & Notable Incidents

Wineloader first appeared in June 2019 and was heavily used during the 2020 Ryuk campaigns targeting U.S. hospitals and municipal governments, most notably the attack on the City of Austin, Texas in December 2020. No CVE is directly associated with the loader itself; instead it leverages #CVE‑2020‑1472 (Zerologon) and #CVE‑2021‑34527 (PrintNightmare) for lateral movement after deployment. Law enforcement actions have included the takedown of TrickBot infrastructure in 2020, which indirectly disrupted Wineloader distribution channels, but the loader remains active in 2023.

🔍 Detection Indicators

Known file hashes include SHA256: 0B8C…A1F2 (variant from July 2020 analysis by FireEye) and MD5: E5A7…93C1. Behavioral signatures include spawning of rundll32.exe from a non‑standard location and network traffic to IP ranges 185.165.29.0/24 (reported by Proofpoint). Registry persistence is created under HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun with the mutex name GlobalWineLoaderMutex. User‑Agent strings often contain Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1) during C2 beaconing.

☠️ Risk & Impact

The primary damage is ransomware deployment leading to irreversible data encryption and extortion; Ryuk attacks delivered by Wineloader have caused financial losses exceeding $1.2 billion across healthcare, education, and critical infrastructure sectors globally. Data exfiltration via C2 channels before encryption is also common, amplifying extortion leverage.

🛡️ Mitigation

Recommended defenses include application whitelisting to block untrusted DLLs, enabling Microsoft Defender for Endpoint with ASR rules for Office macro abuse, and deploying network detection for known C2 IPs. Hunt queries for process hollowing (Splunk rule: `EventID 4688` paired with `T1055`) are advised. Refer to #MITRE ATT&CK T1574.002 and #CISA Alert AA20‑302A for full mitigations.

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Malware Families Commonly Operate Through Automated Botnets

Many of the malware families catalogued here use bot networks to deliver payloads and scan for exposed servers. Boteraser detects and blocks bot traffic patterns associated with these activities.

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ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the malware listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.