🛡️ CVE-2023-42443 — vyper
Description
Vyper vulnerable to memory corruption in certain builtins utilizing msize
Impact
In certain conditions, the memory used by the builtins raw_call, create_from_blueprint and create_copy_of can be corrupted.
- For
raw_call, the argument buffer of the call can be corrupted, leading to incorrectcalldatain the sub-context. - For
create_from_blueprintandcreate_copy_of, the buffer for the to-be-deployed bytecode can be corrupted, leading to deploying incorrect bytecode.
Below are the conditions that must be fulfilled for the corruption to happen for each builtin:
raw_call
- memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata
and
- The
dataargument of the builtin ismsg.data.
and
- The
to,valueorgaspassed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)
create_copy_of
- memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata
and
- The
valueorsaltpassed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)
create_from_blueprint
- memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata
and
- Either no constructor parameters are passed to the builtin or
raw_argsis set to True.
and
- The
valueorsaltpassed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)
Note: When the builtin is being called from an internal function f from a function g, the issue is not present provided that g has written to memory before calling f.
Examples
raw_call
In the following contract, calling bar(1,1) will return:
``` Python
ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000001
```
instead of:
``` Python
ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
```
```Python
identity: constant(address) = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004
@external
def foo():
pass
@internal
@view
def get_address()->address:
a:uint256 = max_value(uint256) # 0xfff...fff
return identity
@external
def bar(f:uint256, u:uint256) -> Bytes[100]:
a: Bytes[100] = raw_call(self.get_address(), msg.data, max_outsize=100)
return a
```
create_copy_of
In the following contract, after calling test(), the code deployed at self.created_address does not match the bytecode at target.
``` Vyper
created_address: public(address)
@external
def test(target: address) -> address:
# The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory
self.created_address = create_copy_of(target, salt = keccak256(_abi_encode(target)))
return self.created_address
```
create_from_blueprint
In the following contract, after calling test(), the init bytecode used to create the contract deployed at the address self.created_address will not match the blueprint bytecode stored at target.
``` Vyper
created_address: public(address)
salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab")
@external
@payable
def test(target: address):
# The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory
self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=keccak256(_abi_encode(target)))
```
Patches
issue tracking in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/issues/3609, patched in #3610
Workarounds
The complex expressions that are being passed as kwargs to the builtin should be cached in memory prior to the call to the builtin. For the last example above, it would be:
``` Vyper
created_address: public(address)
salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab")
@external
@payable
def test(target: address):
salt: bytes32 = keccak256(_abi_encode(target))
self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=salt)
```
References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
Weakness class
CVE-2023-42443 is classified as CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write. Data is written past the end or before the start of a buffer, corrupting whatever is stored there.
Affected software
CVE-2023-42443 is recorded against 1 package.
- vyper (from 0.3.4 up to 0.3.10)
Timeline and source
Published on 20 September 2023 and last revised on 17 June 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from OSV.
References
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| vyper | 0.3.4 | 0.3.10 |
References
Similar Threats
- High CVE-2023-46247
- Medium CVE-2023-42460
- Medium CVE-2023-42441
- Low CVE-2023-40015
- Low CVE-2023-41052
Exploit Protection
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CVE-2023-42443 carries CVSS 8.0 High rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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