Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Fix the sendmsg byte count in siw_tcp_sendpages Ever since commit c2ff29e99a76 ("siw: Inline do_tcp_sendpages()"), we have been doing this: static int siw_tcp_sendpages(struct socket *s, struct page **page, int offset, size_t size) [...] /* Calculate the number of bytes we need to push, for this page * specifically */ size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE - offset, size); /* If we can't splice it, then copy it in, as normal */ if (!sendpage_ok(page[i])) msg.msg_flags &= ~MSG_SPLICE_PAGES; /* Set the bvec pointing to the page, with len $bytes */ bvec_set_page(&bvec, page[i], bytes, offset); /* Set the iter to $size, aka the size of the whole sendpages (!!!) */ iov_iter_bvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_SOURCE, &bvec, 1, size); try_page_again: lock_sock(sk); /* Sendmsg with $size size (!!!) */ rv = tcp_sendmsg_locked(sk, &msg, size); This means we've been sending oversized iov_iters and tcp_sendmsg calls for a while. This has a been a benign bug because sendpage_ok() always returned true. With the recent slab allocator changes being slowly introduced into next (that disallow sendpage on large kmalloc allocations), we have recently hit out-of-bounds crashes, due to slight differences in iov_iter behavior between the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES and "regular" copy paths: (MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) skb_splice_from_iter iov_iter_extract_pages iov_iter_extract_bvec_pages uses i->nr_segs to correctly stop in its tracks before OoB'ing everywhere skb_splice_from_iter gets a "short" read (!MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) skb_copy_to_page_nocache copy=iov_iter_count [...] copy_from_iter /* this doesn't help */ if (unlikely(iter->count count; iterate_bvec ... and we run off the bvecs Fix this by properly setting the iov_iter's byte count, plus sending the correct byte count to tcp_sendmsg_locked.