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🛡️ CVE-2026-28740 — gitea.dev

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ✅ No Known Exploit NVD
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Gitea: Git LFS object reuse allows non-Code access to authorize private source objects

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

  • an authenticated Gitea account;
  • Code write access to a target repository;
  • non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
  • knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

```text

services/lfs/server.go

```

Relevant handlers:

```text

BatchHandler

UploadHandler

```

Both paths can call:

```go

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

```

The helper is located in:

```text

models/git/lfs.go

```

The authorization check uses:

```go

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

```

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

```text

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

```

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.

2. The source repository is private.

3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.

4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.

5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.

6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.

7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

```text

=== RUN TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess

--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess

PASS

ok gitea.dev/models/git

```

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

  • private source repository;
  • user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
  • user does not have Code access to the source repository;
  • user has Code write access to the target repository;
  • known LFS object exists in the source repository;
  • object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

```text

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

```

Rationale:

  • network re

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is changed, meaning a successful attack can affect components beyond the vulnerable one. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity low, availability none.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: High — the attacker first has to win a race, learn a secret or otherwise prepare the target.
  • Privileges required: Low — an ordinary user account is enough.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Changed — a successful attack reaches components beyond the vulnerable one.
  • Confidentiality impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.
  • Integrity impact: Low — limited, and the attacker does not choose what is affected.
  • Availability impact: None.

Affected software

CVE-2026-28740 is recorded against 3 packages.

  • code.gitea.io/gitea
  • gitea.dev
  • unknown

Timeline and source

Published on 22 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Advisory)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
blog.gitea.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)

Other advisories for this package

code.gitea.io/gitea has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Details

Severity High
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
CWE N/A
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-07-22
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-07-22
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
gitea.dev
unknown

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