🛡️ CVE-2026-33634 — litellm

Trivy ecosystem supply chain was briefly compromised

Summary

On March 19, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.4 release, force-push 76 of 77 version tags in aquasecurity/trivy-action to credential-stealing malware, and replace all 7 tags in aquasecurity/setup-trivy with malicious commits.

On March 22, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 DockerHub images.

Exposure Window

| Component | Start (UTC) | End (UTC) | Duration |

| ------------- | ---------------------- | ----------------- | --------- |

| trivy v0.69.4 | 2026-03-19 18:22 [^1] | 2026-03-19 ~21:42 | ~3 hours |

| trivy-action | 2026-03-19 ~17:43 [^2] | 2026-03-20 ~05:40 | ~12 hours |

| setup-trivy | 2026-03-19 ~17:43 [^2] | 2026-03-19 ~21:44 | ~4 hours |

| dockerhub trivy images v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 | 2026-03-22 15:43 | 2026-03-23 ~01:40 | ~10 hours |

[^1]: Time when v0.69.4 release artifacts became publicly available. The malicious tag was pushed at ~17:43 UTC, triggering the release pipeline.

[^2]: Earliest suspicious activity observed in our audit log.

Affected Components

Note that all malicious components, artifacts, commits, etc have been removed from all sources and destinations (yet they may linger in intermediary caches). Use this information to understand if you have been exposed to the malicious artifacts during the exposure window.

trivy binary and image

You are affected if you used:

1. trivy binaries version v0.69.4 (or latest during the exposure window) distributed via GitHub, Deb, RPM.

2. trivy container images v0.69.4 (or latest during the exposure window) distributed via GHCR, ECR public, Docker Hub.

3. trivy container images v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 (or latest during the exposure window) distributed via Docker Hub.

You are not affected if you used:

1. trivy (binary or image) version v0.69.3 or earlier.

1. v0.69.3 is protected by GitHub's [immutable releases](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/releasing-projects-on-github/managing-releases-in-a-repository#creating-a-release) feature (enabled March 3, before v0.69.3 was published).

2. v0.69.2 predates immutable releases enablement but integrity can be verified via sigstore signatures (see "How to Verify" section below).

2. trivy images referenced by digest.

4. trivy binaries built from source.

1. The malicious code was not committed to Trivy's main branch. It was fetched and built on the ephemeral runner, and also committed to a v0.70.0 branch but no release or git tag was ever pushed.

5. homebrew from official formula (brew install trivy)

1. The [official homebrew formula](https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-core/blob/785817ba05ed32eef15490bb105f67bd973aa7c2/Formula/t/trivy.rb) is building trivy directly from source.

2. There's an additional custom [trivy tap](https://github.com/aquasecurity/homebrew-trivy) which was compromised as part of the v0.69.4 release, but that tap requires special installation and is not even mentioned in the trivy documentation.

aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action

You are affected if you used:

1. Any tags prior except 0.35.0 (0.0.1 – 0.34.2) to reference the action.

2. the action's version: latest parameter explicitly (not the default) during the trivy binary exposure window.

3. SHA pinning to a commit prior to 2025-04-09.

1. trivy-action started pinning setup-go with pull request [trivy-action#456](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy-action/pull/456#event-17180670975). If you pinned trivy-action to a commit prior to that PR (merged 2025-04-09), then you would get a safe trivy-action but it would get a malicious setup-trivy, if invoked during the setup-trivy exposure window.

You are not affected if you used:

1. 0.35.0 tag

1. 0.35.0 is protected by GitHub's immutable releases feature (enabled March 4, before 0.35.0 was published) and was not affected by the tag hijacking attack.

2. SHA pinning to a safe commit commit after 2025-04-09.

aquasecurity/setup-trivy GitHub Action

You are affected if you used:

1. Any version without pinning.

You are not affected if you used:

1. SHA pinning to a safe commit.

Attack Details

Root Cause

This incident is a continuation of the supply chain attack that began in late February 2026. Following the initial disclosure on March 1, credential rotation was performed but was not atomic (not all credentials were revoked simultaneously). The attacker could have use a valid token to exfiltrate newly rotated secrets during the rotation window (which lasted a few days). This could have allowed the attacker to retain access and execute the March 19 attack.

Trivy v0.69.4 binary and container images

The attacker created a malicious release by:

1. Pushing a commit (1885610c) that swapped the actions/checkout reference to an imposter commit (70379aad) containing a composite action that downloaded malicious Go source files