Fleet's Apple MDM profile delivery has second-order SQL Injection that can compromise the database
Summary
A critical second-order SQL Injection vulnerability in Fleet's Apple MDM profile delivery pipeline could allow an attacker with a valid MDM enrollment certificate to exfiltrate or modify the contents of the Fleet database, including user credentials, API tokens, and device enrollment secrets.
Impact
If Apple MDM is enabled, an attacker controlling an enrolled device can send a malicious UDID during the MDM Authenticate check-in. The UDID is stored safely via parameterized queries, but is later interpolated directly into SQL when the async worker processes the job. This enables blind, boolean-based, and UNION-based SQL injection across four simultaneous subqueries.
Because Fleet's database driver is configured with multiStatements=true, the attacker can also execute stacked queries, enabling arbitrary writes to the database. This includes inserting new admin accounts, modifying configuration, deploying malicious profiles or scripts to managed devices, and deleting data.
Exploitation requires a valid SCEP-issued enrollment certificate (mTLS), but any enrolled device, including attacker-controlled devices, can exploit this vulnerability.
This issue does not affect instances where Apple MDM is disabled.
Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, affected Fleet users should temporarily disable Apple MDM.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
Send an email to [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:[email protected])
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Credits
Fleet thanks@secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.
