Systeminformation vulnerable to Linux command injection in networkInterfaces() via unsanitized NetworkManager connection profile name
Summary
On Linux, systeminformation is vulnerable to command injection in networkInterfaces() when an active NetworkManager connection profile name contains shell metacharacters.
This is not caused by a caller passing attacker-controlled arguments into networkInterfaces(). The vulnerable value is obtained internally from real nmcli device status output. The library sanitizes the network interface name before using it in shell commands, but it does not apply equivalent sanitization to the parsed NetworkManager connection profile name. That unsanitized connectionName is then interpolated into three shell command strings executed through execSync().
This issue was validated locally against real NetworkManager and real nmcli. Calling only:
```js
require('./lib').networkInterfaces()
```
was enough to trigger execution. The injected command ran with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.
Affected Component & Versions
Affected component:
- [
lib/network.js](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js) networkInterfaces()- Linux NetworkManager /
nmcli handling
Impact & Threat Model
Confirmed impact:
An attacker who can create or rename an active NetworkManager connection profile can execute arbitrary shell commands when a Node.js process using systeminformation calls networkInterfaces().
Confirmed realistic affected deployments include:
- local inventory agents
- monitoring agents
- diagnostics tools
- admin dashboard backends collecting host information
- privileged local desktop or device-management agents
If such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command executes with those same elevated privileges.
Confirmed facts:
- The payload was stored as a real NetworkManager connection profile name.
- Real
nmcli device status returned the name unchanged. networkInterfaces() parsed that value and reused it in shell commands.- The injected command ran as the calling Node.js process.
- Environment key categories were reachable from the injected process context.
Not claimed:
- No remote exploitation claim is made.
- No
AV:N or AV:A claim is made. - No SSID-to-connection-name attack path is claimed.
- File-delivery-only
.nmconnection import was not confirmed as a remote or unauthenticated path.
Root Cause Analysis
The root cause is inconsistent trust handling between the Linux interface name and the NetworkManager connection profile name.
The interface name is sanitized before it is embedded into shell commands:
```js
const iface = dev.split(':')[0].trim();
const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(iface);
```
However, the NetworkManager connection name is parsed from command output and later reused without equivalent sanitization:
```js
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
const connectionName = connectionNameLines.join(' ');
return connectionName !== '--' ? connectionName : '';
```
That is unsafe because NetworkManager profile names can contain shell metacharacters. Quoting the value inside "${connectionName}" does not make it safe. A connection name containing ", $(), ;, backticks, or similar shell syntax can break out of the intended argument context or trigger command substitution.
The vulnerable code executes through execSync(), which invokes a shell for command strings. As a result, interpolating connectionName into the command string creates a command-injection sink.
Exact Code Flow & File Paths
Source: [lib/network.js:538-544](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L538-L544)
```js
function getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(interfaceName) {
const cmd = nmcli device status 2>/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName};
try {
const result = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString();
const resultFormat = result.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
```
The parsed value is then returned as connectionName.
Trigger: [lib/network.js:987-991](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L987-L991)
```js
lines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split('\n');
const connectionName = getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(ifaceSanitized);
dhcp = getLinuxIfaceDHCPstatus(ifaceSanitized, connectionName, _dhcpNics);
dnsSuffix = getLinuxIfaceDNSsuffix(connectionName);
ieee8021xAuth = getLinuxIfaceIEEE8021xAuth(connectionName);
```
Sink 1: [lib/network.js:620](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L620-L620)
```js
const cmd =
