Rancher vulnerable to command injection through unsanitized YAML parameter
Impact
A critical command injection vulnerability has been identified in the Rancher Manager cluster import endpoint /v3/import/{token}_{clusterId}.yaml through unsanitized YAML parameters. This endpoint accepts an authImage query parameter that is rendered without sanitization into a generated Kubernetes manifest template. By including URL-encoded newlines in the parameter value, an attacker can break out of the image: field to inject arbitrary YAML keys and malicious configurations, such as commands to execute malicious containers.
Exploitation of this vulnerability requires the following conditions to be met:
- Attackers must obtain a valid cluster registration token (these tokens may be exposed, for example, through documentation, screenshots, or insecure communication channels).
- The victim’s cluster operator must execute
kubectl apply against a maliciously crafted URL.
When a victim applies this compromised manifest using kubectl apply, a DaemonSet is deployed with the injected configuration. This DaemonSet:
- Runs on all control-plane nodes with
hostNetwork: true enabled. - Uses the
cattle service account, which possesses cluster-admin privileges. - Mounts
/etc/kubernetes directly from the host. - Executes attacker-controlled commands via the injected
command: field.
An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability could:
- Achieve full control over downstream Kubernetes clusters.
- Execute arbitrary code on control-plane nodes with elevated privileges.
- Access sensitive cluster secrets and configurations via the privileged service account.
- Disrupt cluster operations by manipulating critical control-plane workloads.
- Establish persistent access through the deployed DaemonSet.
Note: If you believe that you might have been impacted by this vulnerability, it's highly advised to review your clusters' logs and deployment logs for signs of malicious deployments and to rotate all service accounts and credentials that might have been exposed in such a scenario.
Please refer to the associated [MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/) for further information about this category of attack.
Patches
This vulnerability is addressed by validating the authImage parameter to ensure it contains only valid OCI image reference characters, rejecting any input containing newlines, whitespace, or other characters that could break YAML syntax.
Patched versions of Rancher include release v2.14.2, v2.13.6, v2.12.10, v2.11.14 and v2.10.12.
Workarounds
If upgrading to a patched version immediately is not feasible, users are encouraged to apply the following workaround:
- Review the
kube-api-auth DaemonSet: Inspect downstream clusters for the kube-api-auth DaemonSet within the cattle-system namespace (which targets control-plane nodes). Review this resource configuration carefully for: - Unexpected
command: or args: fields in the container specification. - References to non-standard or suspicious container images.
- Any modifications occurring after the initial cluster import.
- Validate manifest integrity: Before running
kubectl apply on any import manifests, verify that the source URLs originate from trusted sources and match expected patterns.
Credits
This security issue was reported by the following collaborators according to our responsible disclosure policy:
- Radisauskas Arnoldas from NATO and the NATO Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).
- Michael Wollner from Deutsche Telekom AG.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.
- Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).
