🛡️ CVE-2026-47735 — arc
Description
Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks
Summary
Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.
Impact
Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:
```
POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}
```
Confirmed reachable targets:
auth.db— bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.arc.toml— S3 secrets, TLS keys./proc/self/environ— environment-variable secrets.- Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
- SSRF when
httpfsis loaded (any S3-backed deployment) —read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')reaches instance metadata IPs.
Patches
Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:
1. SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
2. SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
3. Verified by reading back the flag.
After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.
Workarounds
- Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
- Temporary mitigation: add
read_csv*/read_json*/globetc. todangerousSQLPatternininternal/api/query.gopending 2026.06.1.
Credits
Reported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity none, availability none.
Weakness class
CVE-2026-47735 is classified as CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information. Information that should stay internal is disclosed to someone who is not authorised to see it.
Affected software
CVE-2026-47735 is recorded against 1 package.
- github.com/basekick-labs/arc
Timeline and source
Published on 8 June 2026 and last revised on 25 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
References
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
Details
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/basekick-labs/arc | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
- High CVE-2026-48050
More CVE 2026 advisories
Browse all of CVE 2026 in the advisory index.
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