Shopware: Unauthorized Payment Trigger for Foreign Orders via /store-api/handle-payment
The Shopware Store API endpoint /store-api/handle-payment contains an object-level authorization flaw that allows a low-privileged external user with a normal customer or guest context to trigger the payment flow for another user’s order by supplying a foreign orderId. The affected functionality is the Store API payment initiation and retry flow. The root cause is that the endpoint forwards the user-controlled orderId into the payment processing logic without verifying that the caller owns the referenced order or has passed the required guest-order authentication. As a result, payment attempts for foreign orders are accepted by the server, which can compromise the integrity of order and payment workflows.
Shopware exposes /store-api/handle-payment to initiate or retry the payment flow for an already created order. Under the normal order access model, customers should only be able to view or act on their own orders, and guest users should only be able to access guest orders after completing additional verification such as deepLinkCode, email address, and postal code. The Store API /store-api/order route follows this model: authenticated customers only see their own orders, and guest users are denied access unless guest-order authentication is performed. However, /store-api/handle-payment does not follow the same protection model. It only checks whether the supplied orderId exists and then directly forwards it into the payment processing flow. As a result, an attacker who cannot read orders through the intended protected route can still trigger the payment retry or payment initiation logic for another customer’s order as long as they know a valid foreign order ID. Although orderId is a UUID-based identifier and is not trivially guessable, it is used throughout storefront order flows such as checkout finish, account order pages, payment change flows, and download links. It is therefore a business object identifier, not a secret bearer token. The server must not treat knowledge of a valid orderId as sufficient authorization and must instead verify that the caller is entitled to act on the referenced order. This is a backend authorization flaw caused by missing ownership validation on a sensitive order action.
/store-api/handle-payment should only be available when the caller is the legitimate owner of the referenced order or, in the case of a guest order, when the required guest-order authentication has been completed. Before processing a supplied orderId, the server should verify that the current SalesChannelContext belongs to the customer associated with that order, or that the caller has successfully passed the expected guest-order verification flow. At a minimum, it should follow the same object-level authorization model used by the protected /store-api/order route.
The vulnerable endpoint accepts orderId, checks only that the order exists and has a currency, and then forwards it into the payment processor without any ownership validation.
```php
#[Route(path: '/store-api/handle-payment', name: 'store-api.payment.handle', methods: ['GET', 'POST'])]
public function load(Request $request, SalesChannelContext $context): HandlePaymentMethodRouteResponse
{
$data = [...$request->query->all(), ...$request->request->all()];
$this->dataValidator->validate($data, $this->createDataValidation());
/** @var array{orderId: string, finishUrl?: string, errorUrl?: string} $data */
$orderCurrencyId = $this->getCurrencyFromOrder($data['orderId'], $context->getContext());
if ($context->getCurrencyId() !== $orderCurrencyId) {
$context = $this->contextService->get(
new SalesChannelContextServiceParameters(
$context->getSalesChannelId(),
$context->getToken(),
$context->getLanguageId(),
$orderCurrencyId,
)
);
}
$response = $this->paymentProcessor->pay(
$data['orderId'],
$request,
$context,
$data['finishUrl'] ?? null,
$data['errorUrl'] ?? null,
);
return new HandlePaymentMethodRouteResponse($response);
}
```
File: src/Core/Checkout/Payment/SalesChannel/HandlePaymentMethodRoute.php
The internal payment processing path similarly uses the supplied orderId to find the current transaction without checking whether the current caller owns the order.
```php
public function pay(
string $orderId,
Request $request,
SalesChannelContext $salesChannelContext,
?string $finishUrl = null,
?string $errorUrl = null,
): ?RedirectResponse {
$transaction = $this->getCurrentOrderTransaction($orderId, $salesChannelContext->getContext());
if (!$transaction) {
return null;
}
$response = $paymentHandler->pay($request, $transactionStruct, $sal
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CVE-2026-48016 is classified as CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing. Identity is inferred from something an attacker can forge, such as a header or address.
CVE-2026-48016 is recorded against 3 packages.
Published on 4 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
shopware/core has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| shopware/core | — | 6.6.10.18 |
| shopware/platform | — | 6.6.10.18 |
| unknown | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
Vulnerability Monitoring
CVE-2026-48016 is rated CVSS 4.3 Medium. BotEraser monitors your WordPress installation and notifies you when software you use appears in our vulnerability database.
Set Up Free Alerts →No credit card required · Results in minutes
ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the vulnerabilities listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.
Stay up to date with the latest from Boteraser.
We use cookies to improve your experience on our site. By using our site, you consent to cookies.
Manage your cookie preferences below:
Essential cookies enable basic functions and are necessary for the proper function of the website.
CloudFlare provides web performance and security solutions, enhancing site speed and protecting against threats.
Service URL: developers.cloudflare.com (opens in a new window)
These cookies are needed for adding comments on this website.
These cookies are used for managing login functionality on this website.
Statistics cookies collect information anonymously. This information helps us understand how visitors use our website.
Google Analytics is a powerful tool that tracks and analyzes website traffic for informed marketing decisions.
Service URL: policies.google.com (opens in a new window)
You can find more information in our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy.