🛡️ CVE-2026-56814 — plug

Plug: multipart :length limit is not charged for part headers, enabling unbounded temp-file creation (denial of service)

Summary

Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART, the multipart request-body parser used to handle file uploads and multipart forms, does not enforce its :length budget against all consumed resources, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. The parser charges the :length limit only for part body bytes; part header bytes are never counted, and a part with an empty body costs zero.

Because every part whose Content-Disposition carries a non-empty filename creates a fresh temporary file (via Plug.Upload) and retains a Plug.Upload struct for the duration of the request, an attacker can send a single request composed of many empty-body file parts. Such a request stays well under the configured :length limit (8,000,000 bytes by default) while creating one temporary file per part, leading to inode and disk exhaustion and unbounded memory growth. Any application using Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is affected, and no authentication is required, only reachability of a multipart endpoint over HTTP.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex and program routines Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse\_multipart/2, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse\_multipart\_headers/5, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse\_multipart\_body/4, and Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse\_multipart\_file/4.

This issue affects plug: from 1.4.0 before 1.16.6, from 1.17.0 before 1.17.4, from 1.18.0 before 1.18.5, from 1.19.0 before 1.19.5, and from 1.20.0 before 1.20.3.