🛡️ CVE-2026-59879 — immutable

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ⚠️ Exploit Public CWE-1284 OSV
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Immutable.js List 32-bit trie overflow → unrecoverable DoS

Summary

List#set, List#setSize, List#setIn, List#updateIn (and the functional set / setIn / updateIn) mishandle an index or size in the range [2 30, 2 31):

  • On an empty List the operation enters an uncatchable infinite loop (a tight CPU spin; a surrounding try/catch never regains control). Only killing the worker recovers it.
  • On a populated List (≥ 32 elements — i.e. any array of ≥ 32 items turned into a List by fromJS) the loop allocates without bound → heap exhaustion → the process aborts (SIGABRT, exit 134, or kernel OOM-kill 137). A real crash, not a recoverable error.

The index may be a numeric string, so it can come straight from a request body, URL, or key-path. A single small unauthenticated request is enough.

There is also a companion silent data-corruption issue in setSize:

```js

List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // before fix => size 0 (silently cleared)

List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // before fix => size 5 (huge value wraps to 5)

```

Impact

Availability only. A reachable configuration is any endpoint that routes untrusted input into a List index or a setIn/updateIn key-path — which the extremely common state = fromJS(body); state.setIn(userPath, value) pattern does (config stores, document/collection editors, redux-immutable reducers, JSON-Patch endpoints, etc.).

No confidentiality or integrity impact, no RCE. The companion setSize bug can silently corrupt application state (wrong size) without crashing.

Reproduction (immutable 5.1.7)

```ts

import { fromJS, List } from 'immutable';

// 1) Populated List: OOM -> process abort (SIGABRT, exit 134) within ~2s

fromJS({ items: new Array(64).fill(0) }).setIn(['items', '1073741824'], 'x');

// 2) Empty List: hangs forever, uncatchable

List().set(2 ** 30, 'x');

// 3) Silent truncation

List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // => size 0

List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // => size 5

```

A remote 43-byte HTTP request ({"path":["items","1073741824"],"value":"x"}) is sufficient to abort a worker that applies it via state = state.setIn(path, value).

Any index in [2 30, 2 31) works (1073741824, 2000000000, …). An index in [2 31, 2 32) does not crash — it silently wraps (clearing the List) via the same root cause.

Root cause

List stores its values in a 32-wide trie (SHIFT = 5, so each level addresses 5 more bits) and uses signed 32-bit bitwise arithmetic throughout setListBounds() (src/List.js):

1. Infinite loop (the hang / OOM). The level-raising loop

```js

while (newTailOffset >= 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT)) {

newRoot = new VNode(

newRoot && newRoot.array.length ? [newRoot] : [],

owner

);

newLevel += SHIFT;

}

```

relies on 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT). A JavaScript shift count is taken mod 32, so once newLevel + SHIFT reaches 31 the term goes negative (1 << 31 === -2147483648) and at 32 wraps to 1 (1 << 35 === 8). The comparison then stays true forever and the loop never terminates. On a populated List, each iteration retains a new VNode ([newRoot]), so the heap fills and V8 aborts; on an empty List it spins on CPU without allocating.

2. Silent wraparound (the setSize corruption). The begin |= 0 / end |= 0 coercion (ToInt32) silently wraps large finite values ((2 31) | 0 === -2147483648, (2 32 + 5) | 0 === 5), producing a wrong resulting size instead of an error.

The threshold is 2 ** 30: that is the largest size for which 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT) stays a valid positive 32-bit integer throughout the loops (newLevel + SHIFT stays ≤ 30).

Remediation

The fix is contained to setListBounds() in src/List.js:

1. Validate up front, before the lossy | 0 coercion. Compute the intended origin and capacity in full precision and throw a clear, catchable RangeError when they exceed the addressable range (MAX_LIST_SIZE = 2 ** 30). Infinity/NaN are left to the existing | 0 → 0 behaviour (so setSize(Infinity) stays 0 and slice(0, Infinity) still means "to the end").

2. Stop the shift from wrapping. Replace 1 << exp in the level-raising loops with a helper that uses the cheap bitwise shift while it is exact (exp ≤ 30, the common path including every push/setSize/slice) and falls back to the non-wrapping 2 ** exp only for the rare deep trees reached when a negative origin (unshift / negative index) is normalized to a large positive capacity (exp can reach 35 there, where 1 << 35 would wrap to 8).

This turns every hang, the misleading "Maximum call stack size exceeded", the OOM/SIGABRT, and the silent setSize truncation into one descriptive RangeError, preserves all behaviour for sizes < 2 30, and keeps the hot push path on the fast bitwise shift (the 2 exp branch is never reached by non-negative operations).

Is the new

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

Affected software

CVE-2026-59879 is recorded against 1 package.

  • immutable

Timeline and source

Published on 21 July 2026 and last revised on 23 July 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from OSV.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)

Details

Severity HIGH
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-1284
Public Exploit ⚠️ Yes
Source OSV
Published 2026-07-21
Updated 2026-08-12
Modified 2026-07-23

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
immutable

Exploit Protection

Are you running immutable?

CVE-2026-59879 carries CVSS 8.0 High rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.

Check My Site For CVE-2026-59879 →

No credit card required  ·  Results in minutes

ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the vulnerabilities listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.