🛡️ CVE-2026-59879 — immutable
Description
Immutable.js List 32-bit trie overflow → unrecoverable DoS
Summary
List#set, List#setSize, List#setIn, List#updateIn (and the functional set / setIn / updateIn) mishandle an index or size in the range [2 30, 2 31):
- On an empty
Listthe operation enters an uncatchable infinite loop (a tight CPU spin; a surroundingtry/catchnever regains control). Only killing the worker recovers it. - On a populated
List(≥ 32 elements — i.e. any array of ≥ 32 items turned into aListbyfromJS) the loop allocates without bound → heap exhaustion → the process aborts (SIGABRT, exit134, or kernel OOM-kill137). A real crash, not a recoverable error.
The index may be a numeric string, so it can come straight from a request body, URL, or key-path. A single small unauthenticated request is enough.
There is also a companion silent data-corruption issue in setSize:
```js
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // before fix => size 0 (silently cleared)
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // before fix => size 5 (huge value wraps to 5)
```
Impact
Availability only. A reachable configuration is any endpoint that routes untrusted input into a List index or a setIn/updateIn key-path — which the extremely common state = fromJS(body); state.setIn(userPath, value) pattern does (config stores, document/collection editors, redux-immutable reducers, JSON-Patch endpoints, etc.).
No confidentiality or integrity impact, no RCE. The companion setSize bug can silently corrupt application state (wrong size) without crashing.
Reproduction (immutable 5.1.7)
```ts
import { fromJS, List } from 'immutable';
// 1) Populated List: OOM -> process abort (SIGABRT, exit 134) within ~2s
fromJS({ items: new Array(64).fill(0) }).setIn(['items', '1073741824'], 'x');
// 2) Empty List: hangs forever, uncatchable
List().set(2 ** 30, 'x');
// 3) Silent truncation
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // => size 0
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // => size 5
```
A remote 43-byte HTTP request ({"path":["items","1073741824"],"value":"x"}) is sufficient to abort a worker that applies it via state = state.setIn(path, value).
Any index in [2 30, 2 31) works (1073741824, 2000000000, …). An index in [2 31, 2 32) does not crash — it silently wraps (clearing the List) via the same root cause.
Root cause
List stores its values in a 32-wide trie (SHIFT = 5, so each level addresses 5 more bits) and uses signed 32-bit bitwise arithmetic throughout setListBounds() (src/List.js):
1. Infinite loop (the hang / OOM). The level-raising loop
```js
while (newTailOffset >= 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT)) {
newRoot = new VNode(
newRoot && newRoot.array.length ? [newRoot] : [],
owner
);
newLevel += SHIFT;
}
```
relies on 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT). A JavaScript shift count is taken mod 32, so once newLevel + SHIFT reaches 31 the term goes negative (1 << 31 === -2147483648) and at 32 wraps to 1 (1 << 35 === 8). The comparison then stays true forever and the loop never terminates. On a populated List, each iteration retains a new VNode ([newRoot]), so the heap fills and V8 aborts; on an empty List it spins on CPU without allocating.
2. Silent wraparound (the setSize corruption). The begin |= 0 / end |= 0 coercion (ToInt32) silently wraps large finite values ((2 31) | 0 === -2147483648, (2 32 + 5) | 0 === 5), producing a wrong resulting size instead of an error.
The threshold is 2 ** 30: that is the largest size for which 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT) stays a valid positive 32-bit integer throughout the loops (newLevel + SHIFT stays ≤ 30).
Remediation
The fix is contained to setListBounds() in src/List.js:
1. Validate up front, before the lossy | 0 coercion. Compute the intended origin and capacity in full precision and throw a clear, catchable RangeError when they exceed the addressable range (MAX_LIST_SIZE = 2 ** 30). Infinity/NaN are left to the existing | 0 → 0 behaviour (so setSize(Infinity) stays 0 and slice(0, Infinity) still means "to the end").
2. Stop the shift from wrapping. Replace 1 << exp in the level-raising loops with a helper that uses the cheap bitwise shift while it is exact (exp ≤ 30, the common path including every push/setSize/slice) and falls back to the non-wrapping 2 ** exp only for the rare deep trees reached when a negative origin (unshift / negative index) is normalized to a large positive capacity (exp can reach 35 there, where 1 << 35 would wrap to 8).
This turns every hang, the misleading "Maximum call stack size exceeded", the OOM/SIGABRT, and the silent setSize truncation into one descriptive RangeError, preserves all behaviour for sizes < 2 30, and keeps the hot push path on the fast bitwise shift (the 2 exp branch is never reached by non-negative operations).
Is the new
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.
Affected software
CVE-2026-59879 is recorded against 1 package.
- immutable
Timeline and source
Published on 21 July 2026 and last revised on 23 July 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from OSV.
References
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
Details
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| immutable | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
- High ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-29063
- High ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-59879
- High ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-59880
- Unknown CLSA-2026-1777509598
- Unknown CLSA-2026-1782954035
More CVE 2026 advisories
Browse all of CVE 2026 in the advisory index.
Exploit Protection
Are you running immutable?
CVE-2026-59879 carries CVSS 8.0 High rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
Check My Site For CVE-2026-59879 →No credit card required · Results in minutes
ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the vulnerabilities listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.