🛡️ CVE-2026-59889 — jackson-databind

🟡 CVSS 6.5 — Medium ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-863 NVD
6.5
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization

Summary

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view.

Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): the gap is NOT a per-field inner @JsonView (the unwrapped sub-object's own BeanDeserializer gates inner fields correctly). The unchecked gate is the view of the unwrapped CONTAINER property.

Intent proof (runtime, 2.x HEAD 21dd70dd and 3.x HEAD 7a5939d6)

An @JsonView(AdminView) property that is NOT @JsonUnwrappednull under PublicView (correctly gated). The identical property WITH @JsonUnwrapped → fully populated (bypass). The fix the creator path already received, not applied to the regular-property method.

Impact — write-side mass-assignment / privilege escalation

@JsonView is commonly used as a write-side authorization guard: a public endpoint binds the body under readerWithView(PublicView.class) and groups privileged state in a nested object whose container property is @JsonView(AdminView). When that property is @JsonUnwrapped, an untrusted caller mass-assigns it. PoC: a self-service registration where AccountFlags{role,approved,creditBalance} is @JsonView(AdminView) @JsonUnwrapped; attacker JSON {role:ADMIN,approved:true,creditBalance:1000000} under PublicView binds all three → approved admin with arbitrary balance. The failing gate is a WRITE gate, hence integrity-high (C:N/I:H/A:N); no worse than the C:L/I:L parent and arguably higher as @JsonView-as-write-guard is the exact use case #5971/#5969 defended.

Affected

  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.x: confirmed bypass at 21dd70dd (== released 2.21.4 / 2.22.0 line; includes the #5973 backport). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=true.
  • tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind 3.x: confirmed bypass at HEAD 7a5939d6 (latest 3.x). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=false → the stock-config repro is the common shape where privileged inner fields are individually @JsonView(PublicView) and the developer relies on the container @JsonView(AdminView); the 3.x PoC mass-assigns role/approved/creditBalance under PublicView. (The other simultaneous report's PoC was reportedly fixed on 3.x; this distinct container-property path is not.)

Additive variants (runtime-confirmed both branches; all closed by the same one-line guard)

  • nested @JsonUnwrapped (unwrapped-in-unwrapped) — recursive bypass.
  • merge / readerWithView(...).withValueToUpdate(...) (PATCH/partial-update) — bypass; non-unwrapped merge control gates correctly.
  • builder-based deserializer (@JsonDeserialize(builder=...)) — BuilderBasedDeserializer routes through the same processUnwrapped.
  • Honest non-findings: read-side serialization correctly honors views (no leak); @JsonAnySetter+view and @JsonTypeInfo+@JsonUnwrapped are separate/unsupported behaviors, not this bug.

Fix

Add prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) (when MapperFeature.DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION/active-view applies) to the processUnwrapped() property loop, mirroring processUnwrappedCreatorProperties(). One change closes the impact PoC + all three variants across BeanDeserializer and BuilderBasedDeserializer. Full runnable PoCs (2.x + 3.x) + variant harnesses available on request.

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity high, availability none.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-59889 is classified as CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. An authorisation check runs but reaches the wrong conclusion, permitting actions it should refuse.

Affected software

CVE-2026-59889 is recorded against 3 packages.

  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (from 2.22.0 up to 2.22.1)
  • tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind (from 3.2.0 up to 3.2.1)
  • unknown

Timeline and source

Published on 21 July 2026 and last revised on 3 August 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)

Details

Severity Medium
CVSS Score 6.5
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
CWE CWE-863
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-07-21
Updated 2026-08-12
Modified 2026-08-03
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.22.0 2.22.1
tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind 3.2.0 3.2.1
unknown

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