🛡️ CVE-2026-68500 — mollie-plugin

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-639 NVD
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook

Impact

The shop payment webhook POST /{_locale}/update-payment (route

sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled

parameters: id (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and orderId (the

Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the

Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.

An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid paid Mollie payment ID, for example

from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim

orderId. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to completed (or any other

Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs

are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate

limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.

Patches

Fixed in versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. The webhook now binds the payment to

the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment

was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is

acknowledged with HTTP 200 and no state change is applied. HTTP 200 is intentional,

because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response.

The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads

both of them (mirroring CaptureAction):

  • payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct

flows, stored in CreatePaymentAction.

  • order.getMolliePaymentId() for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself

(QrCodeAction).

Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their

payment details carry no payment_mollie_id, so both sources must be consulted.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by

decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie

id matches the id stored for that order before handing over to the original controller,

so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is

made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.

Step 1. Create the decorator

Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php in your Sylius project:

```php

<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Controller\Mollie;

use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface;

use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface;

use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController;

use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse;

use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;

use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;

final class SecurePaymentWebhookController

{

public function __construct(

private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner,

private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository,

) {

}

public function __invoke(Request $request): Response

{

$orderId = $request->get('orderId');

$molliePaymentId = $request->get('id');

if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) {

return ($this->inner)($request);

}

/** @var OrderInterface|null $order */

$order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]);

if (null === $order) {

return ($this->inner)($request);

}

$storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order);

// Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order.

// 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response.

if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) {

return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK);

}

return ($this->inner)($request);

}

private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string

{

$payment = $order->getLastPayment();

$fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null;

if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) {

return (string) $fromDetails;

}

// QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself.

if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) {

$fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId();

if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) {

return (string) $fromOrder;

}

}

return null;

}

}

```

Step 2. Register the decorator

Append to your project's config/services.yaml:

```yaml

services:

App\Contr

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity high, availability none.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-68500 is classified as CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. An object is selected by an identifier from the request without checking the caller owns it.

Affected software

CVE-2026-68500 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • sylius/mollie-plugin (from 3.3.0 up to 3.3.1)
  • unknown

Timeline and source

Published on 31 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)

Details

Severity HIGH
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
CWE CWE-639
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-07-31
Updated 2026-08-12
Modified 2026-07-31
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
sylius/mollie-plugin 3.3.0 3.3.1
unknown

References

Similar Threats

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