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🛡️ CVE-2026-71318 — nuxt

🟡 CVSS 4.8 — Medium ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-20 NVD
4.8
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Nuxt: Unauthorized Component Instantiation via Server Island Props

Impact

Nuxt server islands accept props via the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint. When an application has a server island component that forwards props directly into Vue's dynamic component resolution (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h()), an attacker can pass a plain string value (rather than a component definition) to instantiate any globally-registered Vue component or any native HTML element.

For example:

```json

{ "as": "SomeGlobalComponent" }

```

...resolves and renders SomeGlobalComponent if it is globally registered, even though the attacker should only be able to drive props for the island's declared component. Similarly, { "as": "iframe" } renders an <iframe> element.

Unlike the primary RCE vector (GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq), this does not require vue.runtimeCompiler to be enabled. A plain string prop is sufficient to trigger component resolution. The template/render key guard that addresses the RCE vector does not block plain string values.

Some component libraries expose a polymorphic as / asChild prop that forwards its value into <component :is>; @nuxt/ui (via reka-ui) is a widely used example. An application is affected if such a component receives the attacker-controlled value inside a server island. Note this does not require explicit prop forwarding: island props the island component does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root element, so an island whose root is a reka-ui / @nuxt/ui component receives the attacker's as value implicitly. Unlike the RCE vector, no vue.runtimeCompiler is required, which makes this vector reachable in more configurations. These libraries are not themselves vulnerable; they are noted only because they commonly provide the dynamic-component sink. Installing @nuxt/ui does not by itself register any component as a server island: the application must define the island (a .server.vue file).

Mitigating factors

  • Exploitation requires a server island component that puts an attacker-controlled value onto a dynamic-component path (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, h(), or a polymorphic as / asChild prop), either explicitly or via attribute fallthrough when the island's root is such a component.
  • Reachable components are limited to what is actually in the island app's global registry. In a default pages-enabled app that is RouterView and RouterLink (both registered globally by the pages router plugin, which runs even in component islands), plus any components/global/ component and any component a module registers globally. RouterLink in particular renders an attacker-influenced <a> (and, because an island that declares no props forwards all props, to and other RouterLink props ride the same fallthrough). Vue built-ins (Transition, KeepAlive, Teleport, Suspense) and Nuxt auto-imports (ClientOnly, NuxtLink, NuxtPage, etc.) are NOT in the island app's global registry and cannot be resolved this way; an unresolved name instead renders as a native HTML element (the element-injection half of this issue).
  • Declaring the props an island accepts, or setting inheritAttrs: false on it, prevents an undeclared as from falling through to a polymorphic root and neutralizes this vector.
  • Arbitrary JavaScript execution is not possible through this vector (no template/render compilation).
  • Island component names are constrained to the build-time component registry; an attacker cannot resolve arbitrary components.

Affected versions

Nuxt >=3.1.0 <3.21.10 and >=4.0.0 <4.5.1, with component islands active. The island prop-forwarding behavior has existed since server islands were introduced in v3.1.0, and this vector does not depend on vue.runtimeCompiler. Nuxt 2 is not affected.

Note the patch (below) closes the implicit attribute-fallthrough path, which is the majority case. An island that *explicitly* forwards an untrusted prop into dynamic component resolution (or forwards it under a prop name other than as) remains the application's responsibility in every version; see Workarounds.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected] and [email protected]. Patched releases reject a top-level as island prop (HTTP 400 at the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint). This closes the implicit path: island props an island does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root, so a top-level as would otherwise reach a polymorphic root component's as prop (the reka-ui / @nuxt/ui convention) and drive dynamic component resolution without the author binding it. Rejecting the top-level as prop blocks that fallthrough while leaving nested data and other prop names untouched.

The framework deliberately does not attempt to block every case: it cannot safely tell a string used as data from one used as a component selector, and it has no island-local hook into Vue's h() or `resolveDynamicComponent

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality low, integrity low, availability none.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: High — the attacker first has to win a race, learn a secret or otherwise prepare the target.
  • Privileges required: None — an unauthenticated stranger can try it.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: Low — limited, and the attacker does not choose what is affected.
  • Integrity impact: Low — limited, and the attacker does not choose what is affected.
  • Availability impact: None.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-71318 is classified as CWE-20: Improper Input Validation. The application accepts input without checking that it has the expected form, so malformed values reach code that assumes they are well formed.

Affected software

CVE-2026-71318 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • nuxt
  • unknown

Timeline and source

Published on 5 August 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)

Other advisories for this package

nuxt has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-20: Improper Input Validation) in other software:

Details

Severity Medium
CVSS Score 4.8
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
CWE CWE-20
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-08-05
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-08-05
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
nuxt — —
unknown — —

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