🛡️ GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f — api
Description
Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Summary
The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.
Root Cause
conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261:
```typescript
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) => {
return response.data as Record<string, unknown>;
});
```
No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.
Protected Code (for contrast)
execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130:
```typescript
const ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);
if (ssrfValidationError) {
// blocked
}
```
This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.
Proof of Concept
1. Create a workflow with a condition step
2. Configure the condition's webhook URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
3. Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event
4. The worker evaluates the condition and calls axios.post() to the metadata endpoint
5. The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API
Impact
Full-read SSRF. The response body is returned as Record<string, unknown> for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details raw field. The GET /execution-details API returns this data.
The POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.
Suggested Fix
Extract validateUrlSsrf() to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:
```typescript
const ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);
if (ssrfError) {
throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...
```
Weakness class
GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f is classified as CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The server fetches a URL supplied by the caller, which can be pointed at internal systems it alone can reach.
Affected software
GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f is recorded against 1 package.
- @novu/api
Timeline and source
Published on 14 April 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
References
Details
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @novu/api | — | — |
References
Site Security Check
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