OpenClaw's dashboard leaked gateway auth material via browser URL/query and localStorage
OpenClaw's macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.
Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway token and password to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser localStorage under openclaw.control.settings.v1.
This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm) - Latest published version verified vulnerable:
2026.3.2 - Affected range:
<= 2026.3.2 - Patched version:
>= 2026.3.7
Impact
An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.
The exposure chain was:
1. macOS Open Dashboard constructed a URL with auth material.
2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL.
3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL.
4. The Control UI persisted the token in localStorage.
Fix
The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:
- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters.
- macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs.
- Control UI keeps Gateway tokens in memory only for the current tab.
- Control UI scrubs legacy persisted tokens from
openclaw.control.settings.v1 on load. - Regression tests cover fragment transport, password omission, and token-scrubbing behavior.
Fix Commit(s)
10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c (March 7, 2026)
Release Process Note
npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.
Thanks @whiter6666 for reporting.
