Malicious code in @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk (npm)
The npm package @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Jupiter (Solana DEX aggregator) SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
Source: amazon-inspector
@wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk 1.2.0 impersonates the Jupiter (Solana DEX) SDK namespace but ships no SDK functionality. package.json wires both preinstall and postinstall to postinstall.js, which fires automatically on npm install. postinstall.js walks the installer's home directory and common locations (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, /tmp) collecting: Solana/Ethereum wallet material (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, keystore files, ~/.config/solana/id.json), MetaMask/Phantom browser-extension state from Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles, seed-phrase and mnemonic.txt/.md/.rtf/.csv files identified by keyword lists and BIP39 wordlist matching (>=10 hits), and standard credential paths (.env,.npmrc,.git-credentials,.netrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_* private keys). Collected file contents (up to 5000 bytes per match) plus host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.homedir()) are POSTed to hardcoded C2 at http://107.161.90.180:7777. Package has empty description, no README, and no legitimate code — it is a pure stealer using a typosquat-of-namespace lure against Solana developers.
