Malicious code in salesforce-vscode-slds (npm)
The salesforce-vscode-slds package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System VS Code tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.
The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.
Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672.
Source: amazon-inspector
The package name mimics Salesforce's SLDS/VS Code ecosystem but ships no SLDS functionality; it is a generic Sentry uploader authored by an unrelated party. The preinstall script (npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js) runs on npm install: examples/verify.js initializes Sentry with a hardcoded DSN (https://d4616e08f531447bd415e91fd21940a6@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672) and sendDefaultPii: true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace, attaches it as ip_address on the Sentry user scope, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes to the hardcoded endpoint — so installing the package emits the developer's egress IP and process metadata to a Sentry project the installer does not own. The package main (src/index.js) also hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN, so any consumer calling init()/check/wrap/reportError without an explicit dsn or SENTRY_DSN silently routes their runtime errors and default PII to the same author-controlled project. The typosquat name is the lure for developers expecting a Salesforce package.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
