Malicious code in polymarket-mcp-v2 (npm)
polymarket-mcp-v2 is an information stealer and remote-access backdoor that runs automatically on npm install. It steals Solana keypairs, .env secrets and other credential files, and installs an attacker-controlled SSH key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then opens port 22 for persistent access. Any host that installed it should be treated as compromised: check ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for an unrecognized key, check the firewall for a newly opened port 22, and rotate Solana keypairs, SSH keys and any secrets in reachable .env files.
The payload is a redeployment of the levex-refa/lint-builder toolkit documented in the February 2026 dev-protocol GitHub organization compromise, against new C2 infrastructure. A postinstall hook (node test.js) requires index.js and calls two functions with no installer action. from_str_2 collects host identifiers, appends the attacker key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, runs sudo chown -R <user>:<user> ~/.ssh, sudo ufw enable, sudo ufw allow 22/tcp, then recurses the filesystem for patterns fetched live from the C2 (/api/scan-patterns, /api/block-patterns) and uploads matches to /api/v1. from_str_1 does a narrower hardcoded search for id.json (Solana keypairs), config.toml and .env. The C2 (170.205.31.203:3001) served a Next.js panel titled "ENV Bot - HYPE"; a dev-mode error disclosed the operator path C:\1\anti-server\bot-wallet-management-v1\.
Source: amazon-inspector
The package's postinstall hook loads index.js and executes routines that (1) recursively scan the install directory for id.json,.env, env, config.toml and Config.toml and POST their contents to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1; (2) fetch an attacker-supplied SSH public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key, append it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, chown the.ssh directory, then run sudo ufw enable and sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to expose port 22; and (3) fetch file-name patterns from the same host, enumerate the user's home directory (Unix) or all logical drives (Windows, via wmic logicaldisk get name with a PowerShell fallback), and batch-upload matching files to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1 with username and platform metadata. Module names, endpoint URLs, and API paths are hidden behind \u00xx unicode escapes and reversed-string constructions to evade static review. The behavior combines install-time credential/file exfiltration with a persistent SSH remote-access backdoor.
