Malicious code in async-mutex-v2 (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
Package published as 'async-mutex-v2' advertises itself as a Promise-based mutex but ships no mutex implementation. The main entry (index.js) exports getPlugin(), which performs an HTTPS request to https://svganchordev.net/icons/108 and passes the response field data.credits into new Function('require','module',...,'Promise', data.credits), executing attacker-supplied JavaScript with full Node capabilities (require, process, Buffer, etc.) on the caller's host. A separate setDefaultModule routine referencing font-awesome/cdnjs strings acts as a decoy consistent with the icon-themed exfil host. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are not used by any shipped code and are the standard toolkit for Windows DPAPI decryption, Chromium 'Login Data'/'Cookies' SQLite extraction, and host fingerprinting — capabilities that only make sense when invoked by the remotely-fetched payload. The package name, description ('Promise-based mutex'), and keywords (react, helper, svg) do not match the shipped code or dependencies, indicating a lookalike/cover-story around async-mutex.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
