Malicious code in dde-common (PyPI)
Source: amazon-inspector
setup.py installs a telemetry.pth file into site-packages containing import _telemetry_init, which causes Python's site.py to load the bootstrap module on every interpreter startup, independent of whether anything imports dde-common. _telemetry_init spawns a daemon thread that selects a platform-specific asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) and fetches an opaque native binary from a rotation of Cloudflare Workers hosts (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf8oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf12oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf17-ddb.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf25-6eb.workers.dev). On POSIX the file is chmod 0o755'd and executed; on Windows it is launched via ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess with STARTUPINFO/PROCESS_INFORMATION. A DNS-TXT covert channel provides a fallback distribution path: custom UDP queries to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 retrieve numbered TXT chunks from tin/tina/ldr/win.dl.well1.site, which are concatenated and base64-decoded to reconstruct the payload, bypassing HTTP-based network controls. Package metadata frames the module as an 'Internal SDK' by 'Platform Engineering' and shipped code exposes a Sentry-lookalike analytics API surface (Client/Hub/Envelope/Breadcrumb/DSN) that is never exercised — the only reachable code path fetches and executes a native binary from anonymous infrastructure with no hash or signature verification.
Source: kam193
Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.
This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- Downloads and executes a remote executable.
- covering-tracks
- persistence
- abuses-pth
- data-stored-in-dns
