🛡️ MAL-2026-11132 — bianira-ui

Malicious code in bianira-ui (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

plugin.js (the package main) contains an appended top-level IIFE that runs on any require/import of the package. Every network-related identifier (http/https/child_process, URL, RPC method names, C2 host, attacker address, request paths) is written as \uXXXX unicode escapes to evade static inspection. The payload queries Ethereum RPC endpoint eth.drpc.org for the latest transaction sent by hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a, derives a C2 IP from the first 4 bytes of that transaction's to field (blockchain dead-drop C2 resolution), then fetches two XOR-encrypted payloads over plain HTTP from paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls on the derived host. The first payload is passed to eval(); the second is executed by spawning node -e with the decoded content as the argument. This yields full remote code execution on any machine that installs and imports the package, with the C2 endpoint dynamically rotatable by the attacker through new Ethereum transactions.