Malicious code in @servicetitan/tokens (npm)
npm/@servicetitan/tokens is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
Source: amazon-inspector
The tarball ships two root-level files not declared in package.json's files whitelist (which lists only core/, ember/, sapphire/, jade/, dist/): an obfuscated setup.mjs and a 727KB math_init.js. package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs, causing setup.mjs to run automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is obfuscated (mangled identifiers such as _0x488df8, string-array indirection) and constructs a URL of the form https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<archive>.zip, downloads and extracts the Bun runtime, chmods it executable, and invokes bun math_init.js on the sibling payload. math_init.js carries the // @bun @bun-cjs header and an obfuscator.io-style shuffled string array (WV8StW rotating n7gIxM) in a 727KB single-line body — a Bun-compiled obfuscated single-file bundle whose contents are never resolved by Node-based tooling because execution occurs under the freshly-downloaded Bun binary. A design-tokens package has no legitimate need for a second language runtime or a 727KB compiled payload at install time; the files' absence from the files manifest is consistent with a malicious republish of the @servicetitan/tokens scope rather than a normal author release. Installing this version causes attacker-authored code to execute on the installer's machine via a runtime that bypasses Node-oriented static scanners.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
