Malicious code in @umacloud/cli-linux-musl-x64 (npm)
npm/@umacloud/cli-linux-musl-x64 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
Source: amazon-inspector
The package's preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temporary directory, extracts it, chmods it executable, and immediately invokes it via execFileSync against math_init.js shipped in the package. math_init.js is a 727KB heavily obfuscated file (obfuscator.io-style rotating string-array dispatcher with hex-named identifiers) that is not declared in the package.json files field (which lists only bin/). Executing an obfuscated sibling script through a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime at preinstall time is not required to deliver a prebuilt native binary (the package advertises itself as bin/umadev); the pattern grants the author install-time code execution on installer machines via a channel that Node-based scanners do not observe. While the runtime is fetched from Bun's official GitHub release, the code executed under it is the package's own obfuscated bytes rather than the runtime's own installer, so this is a dropper for author-controlled code, not an official-runtime install.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
