Malicious code in pfp-forms-sme-loan (npm)
The package executes a hidden loader when it is imported. The loader downloads and runs a platform-specific native payload from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts, or reconstructs the payload from DNS TXT records under well1.site if HTTPS delivery fails. Systems that imported this package should be considered compromised; rotate accessible secrets and investigate temporary-file execution and DNS activity to the listed infrastructure.
Source: amazon-inspector
On require of the package, index.js loads _bridge.js, which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime via Array.join() to defeat static analysis (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.de","v"].join("") and ["tin.dl.","well1.s","it","e"].join("")), with a DNS TXT record fallback that reassembles the payload from covert-channel responses. The fetched bytes are written to a temp path under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_*.exe /.cache_*), chmodded 0o755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true}).unref() on Unix or spawn("cmd",...) on Windows. A companion module lib/telemetry.js (not currently wired into the require graph) contains a fuller variant of the same fetch/decode/spawn logic behind a Sentry-style "analytics SDK" cover story, using string concatenation to hide dangerous APIs (require("child_" + "process"), fs["chmod" + "Sync"]). Requiring or installing the package results in execution of attacker-controlled bytes on the installer's host.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
