Malicious code in beaver-ui-popover-card (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
On require('beaver-ui-popover-card'), _support.js downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints whose hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback resolver chain across sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to a temp path under disguised names (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 0o755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No signature or hash verification is performed. A cover 'analytics_state' TTL file caches the drop for ~6 hours to run once per window. A second dropper of the same shape is bundled in lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) wrapped in a 'telemetry SDK' cover story, using runtime string concatenation to hide API names ('chmod'+'Sync', 'child_'+'process') and base64-decoded chunk reassembly. Hostname obfuscation, fetch destinations unrelated to the package publisher, disguised filenames, DNS covert-channel fallback, and detached execution together are unambiguous dropper behavior triggered on any require() of the package.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
