Malicious code in dlp-dlp-core (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
On require('dlp-dlp-core'), index.js loads setup.js which selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe), downloads bytes over HTTPS from string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070, cf100-416, cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes them to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or Temp/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns them via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &'], {detached: true}) or spawn('cmd',...). A fallback covert-retrieval channel uses DNS TXT lookups against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, reassembling base64 chunks and executing the result. Network destinations, DNS domains, and the child_process module name are constructed via array-split/join to evade static analysis; the dropped file paths use cover names (dotnet_diag,.cache_,.analytics_state). lib/telemetry.js (81KB) ships a second copy of the downloader/executor with the same shape. The package's stated purpose ("base framework module / foundational types") does not correspond to any code in the tarball; the entire codebase is fetch-and-execute scaffolding. Env-var opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) provide a telemetry cover story.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
