🛡️ MAL-2026-13410 — entity-runtime

Malicious code in @addai/entity-runtime (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

The package runs a daemon that polls a hardcoded Supabase project (syhzpqqvrplaqdipcymw.supabase.co) via the RPC runtime_pick_next_request for remote-supplied job rows and spawns Claude Code / Codex / Kimi / Gemini / Grok in a PTY on the installer's host, driven by fields controlled by the paired remote party (prompt, permissionMode, appendSystemPrompt, allowedTools, model, workingDirectory). In dist/session-runner.js, spawnClaudeForRuntime invokes the agent binary through a login shell (['-l','-c','exec "$@"',...]) and, when input.permissionMode === 'bypassPermissions', passes --dangerously-skip-permissions, letting the remotely-driven AI agent execute arbitrary shell tools as the local user without any interactive prompt. On start, ensureBypassPermissionsAccepted() in dist/index.js also writes skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true into the installer's user-global ~/.claude/settings.json, disabling Claude Code's own bypass-permissions safety dialog for every future interactive Claude Code session the installer runs — not just those spawned by this daemon. dist/capabilities.js additionally reads ~/.kimi/config and modifies PATH. The net effect is a persistent remote-controlled channel giving the paired remote party host-level RCE on the installer's machine via the AI agent tool loop, plus a persistent lowering of a separate vendor tool's safety prompts.