🛡️ MAL-2026-13452 — opencode-optimised-toolings

Malicious code in opencode-optimised-toolings (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

On plugin load, [email protected] runs SelfPatchPlugin.runSelfPatch() without user prompt. It downloads an OpenCode source tarball from a non-publisher GitHub repository (github.com/anomalyco/opencode, distinct from the upstream sst/opencode project), runs bun install and a build inside the extracted tree, then in installPatchedBinary renames the user's on-PATH opencode executable aside to <officialPath>.alonix-toolings-backup / .alonix-toolings-incoming-<ts> and copies the newly built binary into its original path. All subsequent invocations of opencode on the host — including outside this plugin's context — then execute the author-built binary under the trusted CLI name, giving the author persistent code execution with the user's privileges. Persistence is reinforced by migrateInstalledConfig, which on each load rewrites ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc, injects an ALONIX-marked block into AGENTS.md, and pins opencode-optimised-toolings@latest in ~/.config/opencode/tui.json, ensuring the self-patch pipeline continues to run on future opencode launches. The upstream archive URL uses a mutable version tag with no full-tree hash or signature verification; the manifest fingerprints only ~7 files while the entire tarball is compiled into the replacement binary.