🛡️ MAL-2026-13499 — delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork

Malicious code in delivery-ci-codeceptjs-fork (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

On require of the package's main entry, _runtime.js reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames via Array.join string-splitting (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) and downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<rand> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &'], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe /c start /b. A DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback reassembles base64-encoded payload bytes from chunked TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru (also string-split as ['sdk.','dl.','wel','1.r','u'].join('')). A second copy of the dropper machinery is bundled in lib/telemetry.js, framed as an 'Analytics SDK', with the same require('child_'+'process') / fs['chmod'+'Sync'](...,0o755) / detached-shell-spawn primitives and base64 chunk assembly. Hostname obfuscation, opaque unverified payload, disguised staging paths mimicking legitimate diagnostics binaries, and detached execution together establish install/load-time remote code execution against any installer that imports the package.